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Abstract
The booms and busts in U.S. stock prices over the post-war period can to a large extent
be explained by uctuations in investorssubjective capital gains expectations. Survey
measures of these expectations display excessive optimism at market peaks and excessive
pessimism at market throughs. Formally incorporating subjective price beliefs into an
otherwise standard asset pricing model with utility maximizing investors, we show how
subjective belief dynamics can temporarily delink stock prices from their fundamental
value and give rise to asset price booms that ultimately result in a price bust. The model
successfully replicates (1) the volatility of stock prices and (2) the positive correlation
between the price dividend ratio and expected returns observed in survey data. We show
that models imposing objective or rational price expectations cannot simultaneously
account for both facts. Our ndings imply that large parts of U.S. stock price uctuations
are not due to standard fundamental forces, instead result from self-reinforcing belief
dynamics triggered by these fundamentals.
JEL Class. No.: G12, D84
Bull-markets are born on pessimism, grow on skepticism, mature on optimism and die
on euphoria
Sir John Templeton, Founder of Templeton Mutual Funds
1 Motivation
Following the recent boom and bust cycles in a number of asset markets around the
globe, there exists renewed interest in understanding better the forces contributing to the
emergence of such drastic asset price movements. This paper argues that movements in
investor optimism and pessimism, as measured by the movements in investorssubjective
expectations about future capital gains, are a crucial ingredient for understanding these
uctuations.
We present an asset pricing model that incorporates endogenous belief dynamics about
expected capital gains. The model gives rise to sustained stock price booms and busts
and is consistent with the behavior of investorscapital gains expectations, as measured
by survey data. The model suggests that more than half of the variance of the price
dividend ratio in U.S. post-WWII data is due to movements in subjective expectations.
The standard approach in the consumption-based asset pricing literature consists
of assuming that stock price uctuations are fully e¢ cient. Campbell and Cochrane
(1999) and Bansal and Yaron (2004), for example, present models in which stock price
uctuations reect the interaction of investor preferences and stochastic driving forces in
a setting with optimizing investors who hold rational expectations.
The empirical evidence we present casts considerable doubt on the prevailing view that
stock price uctuations are e¢ cient. Specically, we show that the RE hypothesis gives
rise to an important counterfactual prediction for the behavior of investorsexpectations.
This counterfactual prediction is a model-independent implication of the RE hypothesis,
but - as we explain below - key for understanding stock price volatility and its e¢ ciency
properties.
As previously noted by Fama and French (1988), the empirical behavior of asset
prices implies that rational return expectations correlate negatively with the price divi-
dend (PD) ratio.1 Somewhat counter-intuitively, the RE hypothesis thus predicts that
investors have been particularly pessimistic about future stock returns in the early part
of the year 2000, when the tech stock boom and the PD ratio of the S&P500 reached its
1The RE hypothesis implies also a negative correlation between the PD ratio and expected capital
gains. Since most variation in returns is due to variation in capital gains, we tend to use both terms
interchangeably.
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all-time maximum. As we document, the available survey evidence implies precisely the
opposite: all quantitative survey measures of investorsreturn (or capital gain) expecta-
tions available for the U.S. economy, unambiguously and unanimously correlate positively
with the PD ratio; and perhaps not surprisingly, return expectations reached a temporary
maximum rather than a minimum in the early part of the year 2000, i.e., precisely at
the peak of the tech stock boom, a fact previously shown in Vissing-Jorgensen (2003).
Using a formal test we conrm that the survey data is at odds with the RE hypothesis at
any conventional signicance level because survey expectations and RE covary di¤erently
with the PD ratio.
The positive comovement of stock prices and survey expectations suggests that price
uctuations are amplied by overly optimistic beliefs at market peaks and by overly
pessimistic beliefs at market throughs. Furthermore, it suggests that investorscapital
gains expectations are inuenced - at least partly - by the capital gains observed in the
past, in line with evidence presented by Malmendier and Nagel (2011). Indeed, a simple
adaptive updating equation captures the time series behavior of the survey data and its
correlation with the PD ratio very well.
Taken together, these observations motivate the construction of an asset pricing model
in which investors hold subjective beliefs about the capital gains from stock investments.2
We incorporate such beliefs into a Lucas (1978) asset pricing model, assuming that agents
are uncertain about the capital gains process but invest optimally given their beliefs and
update beliefs according to Bayeslaw.
With this modication, the Lucas model with standard time separable preferences and
standard stochastic driving processes becomes quantitatively consistent with the observed
volatility of stock prices and the positive correlation between the PD ratio and subjective
return expectations. Considering the same model under RE, produces - amongst other
things - too little price volatility and the wrong sign for the correlation between the PD
ratio and expected returns.
The strong improvement in the models empirical performance arises because agents
attempts to improve their knowledge about price behavior can temporarily delink asset
prices from their fundamental (RE) value and give rise to belief-driven boom and bust
cycles in stock prices. This occurs because with imperfect information about the price
process, optimal behavior dictates that agents use past capital gains observations to
learn about the stochastic process governing the behavior of capital gains; this generates
2As is explained in Adam and Marcet (2011), the presence of subjective price beliefs reects a lack
of common knowledge about agentsbeliefs and preferences.
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a feedback between capital gain expectations and realized capital gains.
Suppose, in line with the empirical evidence, that agents become more optimistic
about future capital gains whenever they are positively surprised by past capital gains.3
A positive surprise then increases asset prices further, whenever increased optimism leads
to an increase in investorsasset demand. If this e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong, then positive
surprises trigger further positive surprises and thus further price increases. As we show
analytically, stock prices in our model do increase with capital gain optimism whenever
the substitution e¤ect of increased optimism dominates the wealth e¤ect of such belief
changes. Asset prices in the model then display sustained price booms, similar to those
observed in the data.
After a sequence of sustained increases, countervailing forces come into play that en-
dogenously dampen the upward price momentum, eventually halt it and cause a reversal.
Specically, in a situation where increased optimism about capital gains has led to a
stock price boom, stock prices make up for a larger share of agentstotal wealth.4 As
we show analytically, this eventually causes the wealth e¤ect to become as strong as (or
even stronger than) the substitution e¤ect.5 Increases in optimism then cease to cause
further increases in stock demand and thus stock prices, so that investorscapital gains
expectations turn out to be too optimistic relative to the realized outcomes. This induces
downward revision in beliefs, which gives rise to negative price momentum and an asset
price bust.
The previous arguments show how belief dynamics can temporarily delink asset prices
from their fundamental value. Clearly, these price dynamics are ine¢ cient as they are
not justied by innovations to preferences or other fundamentals.
We obtain these results even though we depart from the standard paradigm in a
minimal way only. Specically, we assume that investors are internally rational (IR) in
the sense of Adam and Marcet (2011). This implies that all investors hold an internally
consistent system of beliefs about variables that are exogenous to their decision problem
and choose investment and consumption optimally. Although agentsbeliefs do not fully
capture the actual behavior of prices in equilibrium, in line with the survey evidence,
agents beliefs are broadly plausible given the behavior of equilibrium prices and the
behavior of prices in the data. In particular, agents believe the average growth rate of
3Such positive surprises may be triggered by fundamental shocks, e.g., a high value for realized
dividend growth.
4This occurs because stock prices are high, but also because agents discount other income streams,
e.g., wage income, at a higher rate.
5With CRRA utility, this happens whenever the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is larger than one.
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stock prices to slowly drift over time, which is consistent with the presence of prolonged
periods of price booms followed by price busts.
The current paper shows how the framework of internal rationality allows studying
learning about market behavior in a model of intertemporal decision making, while avoid-
ing some of the pitfalls of the adaptive learning literature, where agentsbelief updating
equations and choices are often not derived from individual maximization. We thus show
how explicit microfoundations can guide modelling choices in settings featuring subjective
beliefs about market outcomes, as is the case in settings imposing RE.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3 documents that there
is a strong positive correlation between the PD ratio and survey measures of investors
return and capital gain expectations and that this is incompatible with the RE hypothesis.
It then documents that from a purely statistical standpoint approximately two thirds of
the variation in the PD ratio of S&P500 can potentially be accounted for by variations
in expected capital gains. Section 4 presents our asset pricing model with subjective
beliefs. For benchmark purposes, section 5 determines the RE equilibrium. Section 6
introduces a specic model for subjective price beliefs; it does so by relaxing agents
prior beliefs about price behavior relative to the RE equilibrium beliefs. This section
also derives the resulting Bayesian updating equations characterizing belief dynamics
over time, involving learning about the permanent component of stock price growth.
After imposing market clearing in section 7, we present closed form solutions for the
PD ratio in section 8 in the special case of vanishing uncertainty. We then explain how
the interaction between belief updating dynamics and price outcomes can endogenously
generate boom and bust dynamics in asset prices. Section 9 considers the model with
empirically plausible amounts of uncertainty and documents its ability to replicate the
time series behavior of the postwar US PD ratio and of the survey data. Section 10
documents that the model under learning replicates important asset pricing moments
much better than under RE. A conclusion briey summarizes and presents an outlook on
future research avenues. Technical material and proofs can be found in the appendix.
2 Related Literature
The literature on adaptive learning previously studied the role of deviations from RE
in asset pricing models. Work by Bullard and Du¤y (2001) and Brock and Hommes
(1998), for example, explores learning about price forecasting and shows that learning
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dynamics can converge to complicated attractors that increase asset return volatility,
if the RE equilibrium is unstable under learning dynamics.6 Lansing (2010) shows how
near-rational bubbles can arise under learning dynamics when agents forecast a composite
variable involving future price and dividends. Branch and Evans (2011) present a model
where agents learn about risk and return and show how it gives rise to bubbles and
crashes. Boswijk, Hommes and Manzan (2007) estimate a model with fundamentalist and
chartist traders whose relative shares evolve according to an evolutionary performance
criterion, showing that the model can generate a run-up in asset prices and subsequent
mean-reversion to fundamental values. DeLong et al. (1990) show how the pricing e¤ects
of positive feedback trading survives or even get amplied by the introduction of rational
speculators. Timmermann (1993, 1996) explores learning about dividend behavior but
nds overall limited pricing implications. Cogley and Sargent (2008) have studied a model
of robustness, where agents learn about fundamentals and behave according to max-min
utility.
We contribute to this literature in three ways. First, we compare the implications of
our model more closely to the data, both in terms of matching the time series of asset
prices and survey data, as well as in terms of matching asset pricing moments.
Second, we specify proper microfoundations for agentsinnite horizon decision prob-
lem with subjective beliefs and derive agentsoptimal consumption plans and belief up-
dating equations from this problem. The subjective consumption plans are then used to
price the stock market. Earlier work on innite horizon models in the adaptive learning
literature typically falls short of specifying proper optimization problems. As explained
in section 2 in Adam and Marcet (2011), this leads to arbitrariness in the modeling of
agentsbehavior, which can a¤ect model predictions and the resulting conclusions. Im-
portant progress has been made in recent work by Eusepi and Preston (2011, 2013), who
derive choices from properly formulated optimization problems featuring subjective be-
liefs. Here we go a step further by jointly deriving the optimal decisions and the belief
updating rules from the utility maximization problem, instead of making appeal to the
anticipated utility framework in Kreps (1998), which implies that future belief revisions
are abstracted from when deriving decisions.
Third, we are able to derive our main results using a closed-form solution. This pro-
vides clearer insights into the economic mechanisms driving the asset pricing results. We
also discuss issues of existence and uniqueness of optimal plans in models with subjec-
6Stability under learning dynamics is dened in Marcet and Sargent (1989).
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tive beliefs and conditions under which the optimal plan has a recursive representation.
Furthermore, we explain why rational agents can hold separate subjective beliefs about
prices and fundamentals.
Fuster, Herbert and Laibson (2011) present an asset pricing model where fundamentals
exhibit momentum in the short-run and partial mean reversion in the long-run and where
agents underparameterize the fundamental process, thereby missing the long-run mean
reversion. They show how such a model can give rise to pro-cyclical excess optimism as
in the present paper. Fundamentals in our model display neither momentum nor mean
reversion, excess optimism and pessimism arise instead endogenously from the interaction
between price outcomes and expectations.
Hassan and Mertens (2010) present a stock market model where investors deviate
from fully rational behavior, as agents make small common errors in formulating expec-
tations. They show how the market amplies these errors and how this can have large
welfare consequences by shifting investment away from domestic production opportuni-
ties into foreign safe bonds. The present model does not consider e¤ects on output and
welfare, instead derives empirical implications for stock price volatility and the behavior
of expectations in a setting with fully optimal behavior and Bayesian updating, given
imperfect knowledge of the economy.
Adam Marcet and Nicolini (2013) quantitatively evaluate the ability of models of
learning to explain asset price volatility. To be able to formally estimate the model using
the method of simulated moments, they rely on a number of short-cuts. In particular,
they assume dividends to be a negligible part of total income, so that consumption equals
exogenous labor income. As a result, the stochastic discount factor is exogenous. While
being analytically convenient, this prevents the emergence of the wealth e¤ects referred to
in the introduction, requiring asset price booms to be stopped by exogenously imposing
an upper bound on agents beliefs.7 Clearly, this prevents a discussion of asset price
booms and their end. They also do not discuss survey evidence.
The experimental and behavioral literature provides further evidence supporting the
presence of subjective price beliefs. Asparouhova, Bossaerts, Roy and Zame (2013),
for example, implement the Lucas asset pricing model in the experimental laboratory
and document that there is excess volatility in prices that is unaccounted for by the
rational expectations equilibrium and that likely arises from participantsexpectations
7The peformance of the model in terms of quantitatively replicating asset pricing moments is, however,
robust to the precise value chosen for this upper bound, because the bound is binding only rarely along
the equilibrium path.
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about future prices. Furthermore, the type of learning employed in the present model is in
line with evidence presented in Malmendier and Nagel (2011) who show that experienced
returns a¤ect beliefs about future asset returns.8
3 Stock Prices & Stock Price Expectations: Facts
This section explains how two important and widely accepted asset pricing facts imply
a counterfactual behavior for the behavior of stock price expectations, whenever one
imposes that agents hold rational price expectations. We present the evidence informally
in section 3.1 and derive a formal statistical test in section 3.2. The test shows that the
RE hypothesis is inconsistent with the survey data because it is incompatible with the
way survey data covary with the PD ratio. Section 3.3 illustrates how simple adaptive
prediction of prices, in line with Malmendier and Nagel (2011, 2013), quantitatively
captures the relationship between survey expectations and the PD ratio. It also shows
how, in a purely statistical sense, variations in expected capital gains can potentially
account for up to two thirds of the variation of the U.S. PD ratio over the postwar
period.
3.1 Survey Expectations and the PD Ratio
This section explains how the presence of boom and bust dynamics in stock prices, to-
gether with the unpredictability of dividend growth imply that investorsexpectations
about future stock returns should correlate negatively with the PD ratio whenever in-
vestorshold rational expectations (RE) about future stock prices. It then documents
that survey measures of investorsreturn expectations correlate instead positively with
the PD ratio; this positive correlation is statistically signicant and robust to considering
di¤erent survey measures and data sources.
As is well known stock prices experience substantial price booms and price busts.
Figure 1 illustrates this behavior for the post-WWII period for the United States, using
the quarterly price dividend ratio (PD) of the S&P 500 index.9 The PD ratio displays
persistent run-ups and reversals, with the largest one occurring around the year 2000.
This shows that price growth can persistently outstrip dividend growth over a number of
8Nagel and Greenwood (2009) show that - in line with this hypothesis - young mutual fund managers
displayed trend chasing behavior over the tech stock boom and bust around the year 2000.
9Quarterly dividend payments have been deseasonalized in a standard way by averaging them across
the current and preceding 3 quarters. See appendix A.1 for details about the data used in this section.
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periods, but that the situation eventually reverses. In fact, the quarterly autocorrelation
of the PD ratio equals 0.98. Similar run-ups and reversals can be documented for other
mature stock markets, e.g., for the European or Japanese markets.
Equally well-known is the fact that the growth rate of dividends is largely unpre-
dictable, e.g., Campbell (2003). It is especially hard to predict using the PD ratio. The
R2 values of an in-sample predictive regression of cumulative dividend growth 1, 5 or 10
years ahead on a constant and the log PD ratio are rather small and amount to 0.03,
0.04, and 0.07, respectively, for the U.S. post-war data.10
Taken together the previous two facts imply that under RE one would expect that
the PD ratio negatively predicts future stock market returns. To see this, let the asset
return Rt+1 be dened as
Rt+1  Pt+1 +Dt+1
Pt
=
Pt+1
Dt+1
+ 1
Pt
Dt
Dt+1
Dt
;
where P denotes the stock price and D dividends. Given a high value of Pt=Dt, we have -
due to the mean reverting behavior of the PD ratio - that Pt+1=Dt+1 < Pt=Dt on average.
Since Dt+1=Dt is unpredictable, it follows that a high PD ratio negatively predicts future
returns.11 A symmetric argument holds if Pt=Dt is low.
In the setup previously described expectations about future stock returns should co-
vary negatively with the PD ratio if investors hold RE. In particular, rational expectations
about stock returns should be very low at the height of the tech stock boom in the year
2000 when the PD ratio reached its historical peak.
Survey evidence on investorsreturn expectations displays instead a strong positive
correlation between investors expected returns and the PD ratio.12 Figure 2 depicts
this for our preferred survey, the UBS Gallup Survey, which is based on a representative
sample of approximately 1.000 U.S. investors that own at least 10.000 US$ in nancial
wealth.13 Figure 2 graphs the US PD ratio (the black line) together with measures of
10We use logPD as a regressor, in line with Campbell (2003). The R2 values are unchanged when
using the level of the PD ratio instead.
11There may exist - at least in theory - other predictors of future returns which correlate negatively
with the PD ratio and that overturn the negative relationship between PD ratio and expected stock
returns emerging from the forces described above. We take these formally into account in our statistical
test in section 3.2, where we show that the the PD ratio negatively predicts future returns in the data.
The latter fact is related to the well-known predictability of excess stock returns using the PD ratio and
the unpredictability of future risk free rates, see Campbell (2003) for example.
12The positive co-movement between return expectations and stock market valuation has previously
been documented in somewhat di¤erent form by Vissing-Jorgensen (2003) and Bacchetta, Mertens, and
Wincoop (2009).
13About 40% of respondents own more than 100.000 US$ in nancial wealth. As documented below,
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the cross-sectional average of investorsone-year ahead expected real return.14 Return
expectations are expressed in terms of quarterly real growth rates and the gure depicts
two expectations measures: investorsexpectations about the one year ahead stock market
return, as well as their expectations about the one year ahead returns on their own stock
portfolio. These measures behave very similarly over the period for which both series are
available, but the latter is reported for a longer time period, so that we focus on it as our
baseline. Figure 2 reveals that there is a strong positive correlation between the PD ratio
and expected returns. The correlation between the expected own portfolio returns and
the PD ratio is +0.70 and even higher for the expected stock returns (+0.82). Moreover,
investorsreturn expectations were highest at the beginning of the year 2000, which is
precisely the year the PD ratio reached its peak during the tech stock boom. At that
time, investors expected annualized real returns of around 13% from stock investments.
Conversely, investors were most pessimistic in the year 2003 when the PD ratio reached
its bottom, expecting then annualized real returns of below 4%.
Table 1 shows that the strong positive correlation evident from gure 2 is robust to a
number of alternative approaches for extracting expectations from the UBS survey, such
as using the median instead of the mean expectation, when using ination expectations
from the Michigan survey to obtain real return expectations, when considering plain
nominal returns instead of real returns, or when restricting attention to investors with
more than 100.000 US$ in nancial wealth. The numbers reported in brackets in table 1
(and in subsequent tables) are autocorrelation robust p-values for the hypothesis that the
correlation is smaller or equal to zero.15 The p-values for this hypothesis are all below
the 5% signicance level and in many cases below the 1% level.
A positive and statistically signicant correlation is equally obtained when considering
other survey data. Table 2 reports the correlations between the PD ratio and the stock
price growth expectations from Bob Shillers Individual InvestorsSurvey.16 The table
shows that price growth expectations are also strongly positively correlated with the PD
ratio, suggesting that the variation in expected returns observed in the UBS survey is
this subgroup does not behave di¤erently.
14To be consistent with the asset pricing model presented in later sections we report expectations of
real returns. The nominal return expectations from the survey have been transformed into real returns
using ination forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Results are robust to using other
approaches, see the subsequent discussion.
15The sampling width is four quarters, as is standard for quarterly data, and the test allows for
contempraneous correlation, as well as for cross-correlations at leads und lags. The p-values are computed
using the result in Roy (1989)
16Shillers price growth data refers to the Dow Jones Index. The table thus reports the correlation of
the survey measure with the PD ratio of the Dow Jones.
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due to variations in expected capital gains. Table 2 also shows that correlations seem to
become stronger for longer prediction horizons.
Table 3 reports the correlations for the stock return expectations reported in the
Chief Financial O¢ cer (CFO) survey which surveys chief nancial o¢ cers from large
U.S. corporations. Again, one nds a strong positive correlation; it is signicant at the
1% level in all cases.
Table 4 reports the correlations between the PD ratio and the realized real returns
(or capital gains) in the data, using the same sample periods as are available for the
surveys considered in tables 1 to 3, respectively. The point estimate for the correlation is
negative in all cases, although the correlations fall short of being signicant the 5% level
due to the short sample length for which the survey data is available. Nevertheless, table
4 suggests that investorsexpectations are most likely incompatible with RE. The next
section investigates this issue more formally.
3.2 Survey Expectations versus Rational Expectations
Using a formal econometric test, this section shows that the RE assumption is incom-
patible with the behavior of survey expectations because RE and survey expectations
covary di¤erently with the PD ratio. The subsequent section presents a simple model of
learning about prices that correctly captures the covariance between survey data and the
PD ratio.
Let EPt denote the agentssubjective (and potentially less-than-fully-rational) expec-
tations operator based on information up to time t, and Rt;t+N the cumulative stock
returns between period t and t + N .17 When these expectations are observable, say via
survey data, one can write the regression equation
EPt Rt;t+N = a
N + cN
Pt
Dt
+ uNt ; (1)
where
E
 
xtu
N
t

= 0 (2)
for x0t = (1; Pt=Dt).
1819 Importantly, the operator E in the orthogonality condition (2)
17In line with the survey data, we consider plain stock returns and not excess returns, which are the
focus of traditional excess return predictability regressions.
18This regression is well-dened, as long as agentsexpectations EPt Rt;t+N and the PD ratio Pt=Dt
are stationary and have bounded second moments.
19Since the Shiller survey reports expectations about capital gains instead of returns, we interpret the
variable Rt;t+N as the real growth rate of stock prices between periods t and t+N when using the Shiller
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denotes the objective expectation for the true data generating process, independently of
how agentsexpectations are formed. The regression residual uNt captures the variation
in agentsexpectations that cannot be linearly attributed to the price-dividend ratio and
summarizes all other information that agents believe to be useful in predicting Rt;t+N .20
We let bcN denote the OLS estimator of cN in equation (1) .21
In the special case with rational expectations (EPt = Et) equation (1) implies
Rt;t+N = a
N + cN
Pt
Dt
+ uNt + "
N
t (3)
where "Nt = Rt;t+N EtRt;t+N is the prediction error arising from the true data-generating
process and thus orthogonal to all past observations dated t or earlier. It satises
E

xt
 
uNt + "
N
t

= 0; (4)
so that an estimate of cN that is consistent with the RE assumption can be derived by
estimating (3) with OLS. We let bbcN denote this estimate.
The correlations reported in tables 1-4 imply - by construction - that bcN > 0 andbbcN < 0. The regression estimates are nevertheless useful because under the RE hypothesisbcNand bbcN are consistent estimates of the same parameter cN , allowing to formally test
the RE hypothesis, i.e., H0 : bcN = bbcN .2223 Clearly, if the asset price and survey data were
generated by a rational expectations model, say the models of Campbell and Cochrane
(1999) or Bansal and Yaron (2004), this test would be accepted.
Table 5 reports the p-values for H0 : bcN = bbcNusing the survey data from the previous
section.24 The point estimates all satisfy bc > 0 and bbc < 0, and the di¤erence between the
survey.
20The residual uNt is likely to be correlated with current and past observables (other than the PD
ratio) and thus serially correlated.
21Sometimes the validity of surveys is questioned because survey responses are noisy data. While this
point applies to many other macroeconomic variables, it is the case that under the standard assump-
tion that the measurement error is uncorrelated with the regressor, the estimators and standard errors
reported below remain valid.
22Under the RE hypothesis, the correlations in tables 1-3 are not equal to the corresponding correlations
reported in table 4, albeit both should have the same sign.
23To obtain p-values for H0 : bcN = bbcN ; we stack up equations (1) and (3), create a SUR system of
equations to nd the joint distriution of bcN and bbcN and build a t-test for H0. We use serial-correlation
and heteroskedasticity robust asymptotic covariance matrix of the estimators, using 4 lags, results are
robust to increasing the lag length to up to 12 lags. For each considered survey we use data on actual
returns (or price growth) for the same time period for which survey data is available when computing
the p-values. Further details of the test are described in appendix A.2.
24Tests for own portfolioexpectations are not shown because we do not observe agentsreturns on
their own portfolio.
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two estimates is highly statistically signicant: the null hypothesis is always rejected at
the 5% level and in all but two cases also at the 1% level. This formally shows that the
RE hypothesis fails to explain the survey data because survey expectations and actual
data covary di¤erently with the PD ratio.
3.3 How Models of Learning May Help
This section illustrates that a simple adaptiveapproach to forecasting stock prices is a
promising alternative to explain the joint behavior of survey expectations and stock price
data.
Figure 2 shows that the peaks and troughs of the PD ratio are located very closely
to the peaks and throughs of investorsreturn expectations. This suggests that agents
become optimistic about future capital gains whenever they have observed capital gains
in the past. Such behavior can be captured by models where agents expectations are
inuenced by past experience prompting us to assume for a moment that agentssubjec-
tive conditional capital gain expectations eEt [Pt+1=Pt] evolve according to the following
adaptive prediction model
eEt [Pt+1=Pt] = eEt 1 [Pt=Pt 1] + g Pt
Pt 1
  eEt 1 [Pt=Pt 1] ; (5)
where g > 0 indicates how strongly capital gain expectations are updated in the direction
of the forecast error. While equation (5) may appear ad-hoc, we show in section 6 how
a very similar equation can be derived from Bayesian belief updating in a setting where
agents estimate the persistent component of price growth from the data.
One can use equation (5) and feed into it the historical price growth data of the
S&P 500 over the postwar period. Together with an assumption about capital gain
expectations at the start of the sample this will deliver a time series of implied capital
gain expectations eEt [Pt+1=Pt] that can be compared to the expectations from the UBS
survey.25 Figure 3 reports the outcome of this procedure when assuming initial beliefs in
Q1:1946 to be equal to  1:11% per quarter and g = 0:02515, which minimizes the sum of
squared deviations from the survey evidence.26 Figure 3 shows that the adaptive model
25We transform the UBS survey measures of return expectations into a measure of price growth
expectations using the identity Rt+1 =
Pt+1
Pt
+ Dt+1Pt =
Pt+1
Pt
+ DDtPt where 
D denotes the expected
quarterly growth rate of dividends that we set equal to the sample average of dividend growth over
Q1:1946-Q1:2012, i.e, D = 1:0048. Results regarding implied price growth are very robust towards
changing D to alternative empirically plausible values.
26The gure reports growth expectations in terms of quarterly real growth rates.
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captures the behavior of UBS expectations extremely well: the correlation between the
two series is equal to +0.89.
A similarly strong positive relationship between the PD ratio and the capital gains
expectations implied by equation (50) exists over the entire postwar period, as gure 4
documents. The gure plots the joint distribution of the capital gains expectations (as
implied by equation (50)) and the PD ratio in the data. When regressing the PD ratio
on a constant and the expectations of the adaptive prediction model, one obtains an R2
coe¢ cient of 0.55; using also the square of the expectations, the R2 rises further to 0.67.
Variations in expected capital gains can thus account - in a purely statistical sense - for
up to two thirds of the variability in the postwar PD ratio.27
The previous ndings suggest that an asset pricing model consistent with equation (5),
which additionally predicts a positive relationship between the PD ratio and subjective
expectations about future capital gains, has a good chance of replicating the observed
positive co-movement between price growth expectations and the PD ratio. The next
sections spell out the microfoundations of such a model. As we show, the model can
simultaneously replicate the behavior of stock prices and stock price expectations.
4 A Simple Asset Pricing Model
Consider an endowment economy populated by a unit mass of innitely lived agents i 2
[0; 1] with time-separable preferences. Agents trade one unit of a stock in a competitive
stock market. They earn each period an exogenous non-dividend income Wt > 0 that we
refer to as wagesfor simplicity. Stocks deliver the dividend Dt > 0. Dividend and wage
incomes take the form of perishable consumption goods.
The Investment Problem. Investor i solves
max
fCit0;Sit2Sg1t=0
EP
i
0
1X
t=0
t u
 
Cit

(6)
s.t. SitPt + C
i
t = S
i
t 1 (Pt +Dt) +Wt for all t  0
where Si 1 = 1 and C
i denotes consumption, u the instantaneous utility of the consumer,
assumed to be continuous, di¤erentiable, increasing and strictly concave, Si the agents
stockholdings, chosen from some compact, non-empty and convex set S such that 1 2 S,
27Interestingly, the relationship between implied price growth expectations and the PD ratio seems to
have shifted upwards after the year 2000, as indicated by the squared icons in gure 4. We will come
back to this observation in section 9.
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P  0 the (ex-dividend) price of the stock, D  0 an exogenous dividend, W  0 the
exogenous wage income, and P i the agents subjective probability measure, which may
or may not satisfy the rational expectations hypothesis. Further details of P i will be
specied below.
Dividend and Wage Income. As standard in the literature, we assume that
dividends grow at a constant rate and that dividend growth innovations are unpredictable
lnDt = ln 
D + lnDt 1 + ln "Dt ;
where D  1 denotes gross mean dividend growth, ln "Dt an i.i.d. growth innovation
described further below.
We also specify an exogenous wage income process Wt , which is chosen such that the
resulting aggregate consumption process Ct = Wt +Dt is empirically plausible. First, in
line with Campbell and Cochrane (1999), we set the standard deviation of consumption
growth to be 1/7 of the standard deviation of dividend growth. Second, again following
these authors, we set the correlation between consumption and dividend growth equal to
0.2. Third, we choose a wage process such that the average consumption-dividend ratio
in the model (E [Ct=Dt]) equals the average ratio of personal consumption expenditure
to net dividend income, which equals approximately 22 in U.S. postwar data.28 All this
can be parsimoniously achieved using the following wage income process
lnWt = ln + lnDt + ln "
W
t ;
where 0@ ln "Dt
ln "Wt
1A  iiN
0@ 1
2
0@ 2D
2W
1A ;
0@ 2D DW
DW 
2
W
1A1A (7)
and E"Dt = E"
W
t = 1. Given the variance of dividend growth 
2
D, which can be esti-
mated from dividend data, one can use DW and 2W to impose the desired volatility of
consumption growth and the desired correlation with dividend growth. Furthermore, one
can choose  = 22 to obtain the targeted average consumption-dividend ratio. Appendix
A.3 explains how this is achieved.
The Underlying Probability Space. Agents hold a set of subjective probability
beliefs about all payo¤-relevant variables that are beyond their control. In addition to
fundamental variables such as dividends and wage income, agents also perceive compet-
28See appendix A.3 for details.
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itive stock prices to be beyond their control. Therefore, the belief system also species
probabilities about prices. Formally, letting 
 denote the space of possible realizations
for innite sequences, a typical element ! 2 
 is given by ! = fPt; Dt;Wtg1t=0. As usual,

t then denotes the set of all (nonnegative) price, dividend and wage histories from pe-
riod zero up to period t and !t its typical element. The underlying probability space for
agentsbeliefs is then given by (
;B,P i) with B denoting the corresponding -Algebra
of Borel subsets of 
, and P i a probability measure over (
;B).
The agentsplans will be contingent on the history !t, i.e., the agent chooses state-
contingent consumption and stockholding functions
Cit : 

t ! R+ (8)
Sit : 

t ! S (9)
The fact that Ci and Si depend on price realizations is a consequence of optimal choice
under uncertainty, given that agents consider prices to be exogenous random variables.
The previous setup is general enough to accommodate situations where agents learn
about the stochastic processes governing the evolution of prices, dividends, and wages.
For example, P i may arise from a stochastic process describing the evolution of these
variables that contains unknown parameters about which agents hold prior beliefs. The
presence of unknown parameters then implies that agents update their beliefs using the
observed realizations of prices, dividends and wages. A particular example of this kind
will be presented in section 6 when we discuss learning about stock price behavior.
The probability space dened above is more general than that specied in a RE
analysis of the model, where 
 contains usually only the variables that are exogenous to
the model (in this case Dt and Wt), but not variables that are endogenous to the model
and exogenous to the agent only (in this case Pt). Under the RE hypothesis, agents
are assumed to know the pricing function Pt((D;W )t) mapping histories of dividends
and wages into a market price. In that case prices carry redundant information and
can be excluded from the probability space without loss of generality. The more general
formulation we entertain here allows us to consider agents who do not know exactly
which price materializes given a particular history of dividends and wages; our agents do
have a view about the distribution of Pt conditional on (D;W )t; but in their minds this
is a proper distribution, not a point mass as in the RE case. Much akin to academic
economists, investors in our model have not converged on a single asset pricing model
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that associates one market price with a given history of exogenous fundamentals.
Parametric Utility Function. To obtain closed-form solutions, we consider in the
remaining part of the paper the utility function
u(Ct) =
C1 t
1   with  > 1; (10)
and also consider agents who hold rational expectations about dividends and wages (P i
incorporates knowledge of the process (7)), so as to be able to isolate the pricing e¤ects
arising from subjective capital gains beliefs. We furthermore assume that
RE < 1; (11)
where RE  (D)1 e( 1)2D=2, which insures existence of an equilibrium under rational
price expectations. Since solving the optimization problem (6) for general (potentially
non-rational) price beliefs is non-standard, appendix A.4 discusses conditions guarantee-
ing existence of an optimum, su¢ ciency of rst order conditions and the existence of
a recursive solution. These conditions are all satised for the preference specication
(10) and the subjective price beliefs introduced in the remaining part of the paper and
guarantee that the optimal solution to (6) takes the form
Sit = S
i

Sit 1;
Pt
Dt
;
Wt
Dt
;mit

. (12)
where mit is a su¢ cient statistic characterizing the subjective distributions about future
values of

Dt+j
Dt+j 1
;
Pt+j
Dt+j
;
Wt+j
Dt+j

for j > 0.
5 Rational Expectations (RE) Equilibrium
As a point of reference, we determine the equilibrium stock price implied by the RE
hypothesis. Appendix A.5 derives the following result:
Proposition 1 If agents hold rational expectations and if price expectations satisfy the
usual transversality condition (stated explicitly in appendix A.5), then RE equilibrium
price is given by
PREt
Dt
= (1 + "Wt )
b
RE
1  RE (13)
where b  E[(1 + "Wt ) 
 
"Dt
1 
]e(1 )
2D
2 and RE  (D)1 e( 1)2D=2.
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The PD ratio is an iid process under RE, thus fails to match the persistence of the
PD ratio observed in the data. Moreover, since the volatility of "Wt tends to be small,
it fails to match the large variability of stock prices. Furthermore, the RE equilibrium
implies a negative correlation between the PD ratio and expected returns, contrary to
what is evidenced by survey data. To see this note that (13) implies
lnPREt+1   lnPREt = ln D + ln "Pt+1; (14)
where "Pt+1  "Dt+1(1+"Wt+1)=(1+"Wt ), so that one-step-ahead price growth expectations
covary negatively with the current price dividend ratio.29 Since the dividend component
of returns also covaries negatively with the current price, the same holds true for expected
returns.
In the interest of deriving analytical solutions, we consider below the limiting case
with vanishing uncertainty (2D; 
2
W ! 0). The RE solution then simplies to the perfect
foresight outcome
PREt
Dt
=
RE
1  RE ; (15)
which has prices and dividends growing at the common rate D.
6 Learning about Capital Gains and Internal Ratio-
nality
Price growth in the RE equilibrium displays only short-lived deviations from dividend
growth, with any such deviation being undone in the subsequent period, see equation
(14). Price growth in the data, however, can persistently outstrip dividend growth,
thereby giving rise to a persistent increase in the PD ratio and an asset price boom;
conversely it can fall persistently short of dividend growth and give rise to a price bust,
see gure 1. This behavior of actual asset prices suggests that it is of interest to relax the
RE beliefs about price behavior. Indeed, in view of the behavior of actual asset prices in
the data, agents may entertain a more general model of price behavior, incorporating the
possibility that the growth rate of prices persistently exceeds/falls short of the growth
rate of dividends. To the extent that the equilibrium asset prices implied by these beliefs
display such data-like behavior, agentsbeliefs will be generically validated.
29The PD ratio under RE is proportional to 1 + "Wt , see equation (13), while "
P
t+1 depends inversely
on 1 + "Wt .
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Generalized Price Beliefs. In line with the discussion in the previous paragraph,
we assume agents perceive prices evolving according to the process
lnPt+1   lnPt = ln t+1 + ln "t+1; (16)
where "t+1 denotes a transitory shock to price growth and t+1 a persistent price growth
component that drifts slowly over time according to
ln t+1 = ln t + ln t+1 . (17)
This setup can capture periods with sustained increases in the PD ratio (t+1 > 
D)
or sustained decreases (t+1 < 
D).30 In the limiting case where the variance of the
innovation ln t+1 becomes small, the persistent price growth component behaves almost
like a constant, as is the case in the RE solution.
For simplicity, we assume that agents perceive the innovations ln "t+1 and ln vt+1 to
be jointly normally distributed according to0@ ln "t+1
ln t+1
1A  iiN
0@0@  2"2
 2v
2
1A ;
0@ 2" 0
0 2
1A1A : (18)
Since agents observe the change of the asset price, but do not separately observe the per-
sistent and transitory elements driving it, the previous setup denes a ltering problem in
which agents need to decompose observed price growth into the persistent and transitory
subcomponents, so as to forecast optimally.
To emphasize the importance of learning about price behavior rather than learning
about the behavior of dividends or the wage income process, which was the focus of much
of an earlier literature on learning in asset markets, e.g., Timmermann (1993, 1996), we
continue to assume that agents know the processes (7), i.e., hold rational dividend and
wage expectations.
Internal Rationality of Price Beliefs. Among academics there appears to exist
a widespread belief that rational behavior and knowledge of the fundamental processes
(dividends and wages in our case) jointly dictate a certain process for prices and thus the
30We deliberately do not incorporate any mean-reversion into price growth beliefs as we seek to de-
termine model-endogenous forces that lead to a reversal of asset price booms and busts, rather than
having these features emerge because they are hard-wired into beliefs. Incoporating such mean reversion
in prices would not be di¢ cult though. Furthermore, as we discus below, return expectations display
some degree of mean reversion even with the present specication.
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price beliefs agents can rationally entertain.31 If this were true, then rational behavior
would imply rational expectations, so that postulating subjective price beliefs as those
specied in equation (16) would be inconsistent with the assumption of optimal behavior
on the part of agents.
This view is correct in some special cases, for example when agents are risk neutral and
do not face trading constraints. If fails to be true, however, more generally. Therefore,
agents in our model are internally rational: their behavior is optimal given an internally
consistent system of subjective beliefs about variables that are beyond their control,
including prices.
To illustrate this point, consider rst risk neutral agents with rational dividend ex-
pectations and ignore limits to stock holdings. Forward-iteration on the agents own
optimality condition (41) then delivers the present value relationship
Pt = Et
"
TX
i=1
iDt+i
#
+ TEP
i
t [Pt+T ] ;
which is independent of the agentsown choices. Provided agentsprice beliefs satisfy a
standard transversality condition (limT!1 
TEP
i
t [Pt+T ] = 0 for all i), then each rational
agent would conclude that there must be a degenerate joint distribution for prices and
dividends given by
Pt = Et
" 1X
i=1
iDt+i
#
a.s. (19)
Since the r.h.s of the previous equation is fully determined by dividend expectations,
the beliefs about the dividend process deliver the price process compatible with optimal
behavior. In such a setting, it would be plainly inconsistent with optimal behavior to
assume the subjective price beliefs (16)-(17).32
Next, consider a concave utility function u() satisfying standard Inada conditions.
Forward iteration on (41) and assuming an appropriate transversality condition then
delivers
Pt u
0(Cit) = E
Pi
t
" 1X
j=1
j Dt+j u
0(Cit+j)
#
a.s. (20)
Unlike in equation (19), the previous equation depends on the agents current and future
consumption. Equation (20) thus falls short of mapping beliefs about the dividend process
31We often received this reaction during seminar presentations.
32See Adam and Marcet (2011) for a discussion of how in the presence of trading constraints, this
conclusion breaks down, even with risk-neutral consumption preferences.
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into a price outcome. Indeed, given any equilibrium price Pt, the agent will choose her
consumption plans such that (20) holds, i.e., such that the price equals the discounted sum
of dividends, discounting with her on internally rational consumption plan.33 Equation
(20) thus fails to deliver any restriction on what optimizing agents can possibly believe
about the price process.
With the considered non-linear utility function, we can thus simultaneously assume
that agents maximize utility, hold the subjective price beliefs (16)-(17) and rational beliefs
about dividends and wages.
Learning about the Capital Gains Process. The beliefs (16) give rise to an
optimal ltering problem. To obtain a parsimonious description of the evolution of beliefs
we specify conjugate prior beliefs about the unobserved persistent component ln t at
t = 0. Specically, agent is prior is
ln 0  N(lnmi0; 2); (21)
where prior uncertainty 2 is assumed to be equal to its Kalman lter steady state value,
i.e.,
2 
 2 +
q
(2)
2 + 42
2
"
2
; (22)
and the prior is also assumed independent of all other random variables at all times.
Equations (16), (17) and (21), and knowledge of the dividend and wage income processes
(7) then jointly specify agentsprobability beliefs P i.
The optimal Bayesian lter then implies that the posterior beliefs following some
history !t are given by34
ln tj!t  N(lnmit; 2); (23)
with
lnmit = lnm
i
t 1  
2v
2
+ g

lnPt   lnPt 1 + 
2
" + 
2
v
2
  lnmit 1

(24)
g =
2
2"
: (25)
Agentsbeliefs can thus be parsimoniously summarized by a single state variable (mit)
33This follows directly from the fact that consumption plans must satisfy (41) at all contingencies.
34See theorem 3.1 in West and Harrison (1997). Choosing a value for 2 di¤erent from the steady
state value (22) would only add a deterministically evolving variance component 2t to posterior beliefs
with the property limt!1 2t = 
2, i.e., it would converge to the steady state value.
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describing agentsdegree of optimism about future capital gains. These beliefs evolve
recursively according to equation (24) and imply that
EP
i
t

Pt+1
Pt

= elnm
i
t e
2=2; (26)
which is - up to the presence of a log and exponential transformation and some variance
correction terms - identical to the adaptive prediction model considered in section 3.3.
Nesting PF Equilibrium Expectations. The subjective price beliefs (16),(17)
and (21) generate perfect foresight equilibrium price expectations in the special case in
which prior beliefs are centered at the growth rate of dividends, i.e.,
lnmi0 = ln 
D;
and when considering the limiting case with vanishing uncertainty, where (2"; 
2
 ; 
2
D; 
2
W )!
0. Agentsprior beliefs at t = 0 about price growth in t  1 then increasingly con-
centrates at the perfect foresight outcome ln D, see equations (16) and (17). With
price and dividend expectations being at their PF value, the perfect foresight price
PD0 = 
RE=(1  RE) becomes the equilibrium outcome at t = 0 in the limit. Impor-
tantly, it continues to be possible to study learning dynamics in the limit with vanishing
risk: keeping the limiting ratio 2=
2
" nite and bounded from zero as uncertainty van-
ishes, the Kalman gain parameter g dened in (25), remains well-specied in the limit
and satises lim 
2

2"
= lim g
2
1 g . We will exploit this fact in section 8 when presenting
analytical results.
7 Dynamics under Learning
This section explains how equilibrium prices are determined under the subjective beliefs
introduced in the previous section and how they evolve over time.
Agentsstock demand is given by equation (12). Stock demand depends on the belief
mit, which characterizes agentscapital gains expectations. These beliefs evolve according
to (24). As a benchmark, we shall now assume that all agents hold identical beliefs (mit =
mt for all i). While agents may initially hold heterogenous prior beliefs mi0, heterogeneity
would asymptotically vanish because all agents observe the same price history. The asset
dynamics derived under the assumption of identical beliefs thus describe the long-run
outcome of the model.
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Using this assumption and imposing market clearing in periods t and t 1 in equation
(12) shows that the equilibrium price in any period t  0 solves
1 = S

1;
Pt
Dt
;
Wt
Dt
;mt

; (27)
which exploits the fact that the total supply of stocks is equal to one.
The beliefs mt and the price dividend ratio Pt=Dt are now simultaneously determined
via equations (24) and (27). Unfortunately, this simultaneity could give rise to multiple
market clearing price and belief pairs, due to a complementarity between realized capital
gains and expected future capital gains.35 While this multiplicity may be a potentially in-
teresting avenue to explain asset price booms and busts, analyzing price dynamics within
such a setting would require introducing non-standard features, such as an equilibrium
selection device for periods in which there are multiple solutions to (24) and (27). In-
stead, we resort to a standard approach of using only lagged information for updating
beliefs.
Appendix A.6 shows that the simultaneity can be overcome by slightly modifying
the information structure. The modication is relatively straightforward and consists of
assuming that agents observe at any time t information about the lagged temporary price
growth component "t 1 entering equation (16). The appendix then shows that Bayesian
updating implies that
lnmt = lnmt 1   
2
v
2
+ g

lnPt 1   lnPt 2 + 
2
" + 
2
v
2
  lnmt 1

+ g ln "1t ; (28)
where updating now occurs using only lagged price growth (even though agents do ob-
serve current prices) and where ln "1t  iiN( 
2
"
2
; 2") is a time t innovation to agents
information set (unpredictable using information available to agents up to period t  1),
which reects the information about the transitory price growth component "t 1 received
in period t.
With this slight modication, agentsbeliefs mt are now pre-determined at time t, so
that the economy evolves according to a uniquely determined recursive process: equation
(27) determines the market clearing price for period t given the beliefs mt and equation
(28) determines how time t beliefs are updated following the observation of the new
35Intuitively, a higher PD ratio implies higher realized capital gains and thus higher expectations of
future gains via equation (24). Higher expected future gains may in turn induce a higher willingness to
pay for the asset, thereby justifying the higher initial PD ratio.
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market clearing price.36
8 Equilibrium: Analytic Findings
This section derives a closed form solution for the equilibrium asset price for the special
case where all agents hold the same subjective beliefs P and where these beliefs imply no
(or vanishing) uncertainty about future prices, dividends and wages. While the absence
of uncertainty is unrealistic from an empirical standpoint, it allows deriving key insights
into how the equilibrium price depends on agentsbeliefs, as well as on how prices and
beliefs evolve over time.37 The empirically more relevant case with uncertainty will be
considered in section 9 using numerical solutions.
The next section provides a closed form expression for the equilibrium PD ratio as a
function of agentssubjective expectations about future stock market returns. Section
8.2 then discusses the pricing implications of this result for the subjective capital gains
beliefs introduced in section 6. Finally, section 8.3 shows how the interaction between
asset price behavior and subjective belief revisions can temporarily de-link asset prices
from their fundamental value, i.e., give rise to a self-feeding boom and bust in asset prices
along which subjective expected returns rise and fall.
8.1 Main Result
The following proposition summarizes our main nding:38
Proposition 2 Suppose u(C) = C1 =(1   ) , agentsbeliefs P imply no uncertainty
about future prices, dividends and wages, and
lim
T!1
EPt RT > 1 and lim
T!1
EPt
 
TX
j=1
Yj
i=1
1
Rt+i

Wt+j
!
<1; (29)
36There could still be an indeterminacy arising from the fact that S () is non-linear, so that equation
(27) may not have a unique solution, but we have encountered such problems neither in our analytical
solution nor when numerically solving the model.
37In the absence of uncertainty one can evaluate more easily the expectations of nonlinear functions
of future variables showing up in agentsFOCs.
38The proof can be found in appendix A.7.
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then the equilibrium PD ratio in period t is given by
Pt
Dt
=

1 +
Wt
Dt
 1X
j=1
 

1

j 
EPt
Yj
i=1
1
Rt+i
  1

!
  1
Dt
EPt
 1X
j=1
Yj
i=1
1
Rt+i

Wt+j
!
(30)
Conditions (29) insure that the innite sums in the pricing equation (30) converge.39
Under the additional assumption that agents hold rational wage and dividend expecta-
tions, equation (30) simplies further to
Pt
Dt
= (1 + )
1X
j=1
 

1

j 
EPt
Yj
i=1
1
Rt+i
  1

!
 
 1X
j=1
 
D
j 
EPt
Yj
i=1
1
Rt+i
!
: (31)
We now discuss the implications of equation (31), focusing on the empirically relevant
case where  > 0 and  > 1.
Consider rst the upper term on the r.h.s. of equation (31), which is decreasing in the
expected asset returns. This emerges because for  > 1 the wealth e¤ect of a change in
return expectations then dominates the substitution e¤ect, so that expected asset demand
and therefore the asset price has a tendency to decrease as return expectations increase.
The negative wealth e¤ect thereby increases in strength if the ratio of wage to dividend
income () increases. This is the case because higher return expectations also reduce the
present value of wage income.
Next, consider the lower term on the r.h.s. of equation (31), including the negative sign
pre-multiplying it. This term depends positively on the expected returns and captures a
substitution e¤ect that is associated with increased return expectations. This substitution
e¤ect only exists if  > 0, i.e., only in the presence of non-dividend income, and it is
increasing in . It implies that increased return expectations are associated with increased
stock demand and thus with a higher PD ratio in equilibrium. It is this term that allows
the model to match the positive correlation between expected returns and the PD ratio.
39These are satised, for example, for the expectations associated with the perfect foresight RE so-
lution. Equation (30) then implies that the PD ratio equals the perfect foresight PD ratio (15), as is
easily veried. Conditions (29) are equally satised for the subjective beliefs dened in section 6, when
considering the case with vanishing uncertainty (2"; 
2
 ; 
2
D; 
2
W )! 0.
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This substitution e¤ect is present even in the limiting case with log consumption
utility ( ! 1). The upper term on the r.h.s. of equation (31) then vanishes because the
substitution and wealth e¤ects associated with changes in expected returns cancel each
other, but the lower term still induces a positive relationship between prices and return
expectations. The substitution e¤ect is also present for  > 1 and can then dominate the
negative wealth e¤ect arising from the upper term on the r.h.s. of (31). Consider, for
example, the opposite limit with  !1. Equation (31) then delivers
Pt
Dt
=
1X
j=1
 
1 + 
1X
j=1

1   Dj!EPt Yj
i=1
1
Rt+i

:
Since D > 1, there is a positive relationship between prices and expected asset returns,
whenever  is su¢ ciently large. The two limiting results ( ! 1 and  !1) thus suggest
that for su¢ ciently large  the model can generate a positive relationship between return
expectations and the PD ratio, in line with the evidence obtained from survey data.
8.2 PD Ratio and Expected Capital Gains
We now consider the implications of equation (31) for the subjective capital gains beliefs
introduced in section 6.40 Equation (31) implies a non-linear relationship between the PD
ratio and the subjective capital gain expectationsmt, but one cannot obtain a closed-form
solution for the PD ratio as a function of the capital gains expectations.41 Figure 5 depicts
the relationship between the PD ratio and mt using the parameterization employed in
our quantitative application in section 9, but abstracting from future uncertainty.42
Figure 5 shows that there is a range of price growth beliefs in the neighborhood of the
perfect foresight value (mt = 
D) over which the PD ratio depends positively on expected
40Appendix A.8 proves that condition (29) is then satised for all beliefs mt > 0.
41More precisely, with vanishing uncertainty the beliefs from section 6 imply
EPt [Pt+i] = (mt)
i
Pt;
which together with perfect foresight about dividends allows expressing agentsexpectations of future
inverse returns as a function of mt and the current PD ratio:
EPt
1
Rt+i
=
EPt Pt+i 1
EPt Pt+i + EPt Dt+i
=
(mt)
i 1 Pt
Dt
(mt)
i Pt
Dt
+

D
i :
Substituting this into (31) one can solve numerically for Pt=Dt as a function of mt.
42The parameterization assumes a moderate degree of risk aversion  = 2, a quarterly discount factor
of  = 0:995, quarterly real dividend growth equal to the average postwar growth rate of real dividends
D = 1:0048, and  = 22 to match the average dividend-consumption ratio in the U.S. over 1946-2011,
see section 9 for further details.
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price growth, similar to the positive relationship between expected returns and the PD
ratio derived analytically in the previous section. Over this range, the substitution e¤ect
dominates the wealth e¤ect because our calibration implies that dividend income nances
only a small share of total consumption (approximately 4.3%). As a result, stock market
wealth is only a small share of the total present value of household wealth (the same
4.3%) when beliefs assume their perfect foresight value (mt = 
D).
Figure 5 also reveals that there exists a capital gains belief beyond which the PD ratio
starts to decrease. Mathematically, this occurs because if mt !1, expected returns also
increase without bound43, so thatEPt
Qj
i=1
1
Rt+i
! 0. From equation (31) one then obtains
Pt
Dt
! 0.
The economic intuition for the existence of a maximum PD ratio is as follows: for
higher mt the present value of wage income is declining, as increased price growth opti-
mism implies higher expected returns44 and therefore a lower discount factor. This can
be seen by noting that the FOC (41) can alternatively be written as
1 = EPt
"
Ct+1
Ct
 
Rt+1
#
;
which implies that increased return expectations EPt Rt+1 imply a lower discount factor
EPt

(Ct+1=Ct)
 .45 With increased optimism, the present value of wage income thus
falls. At the same time, stock market wealth initially increases strongly. Indeed, at the
maximum PD ratio, stock market wealth amounts to approximately 4.5 times the value
it assumes in the perfect foresight solution, see gure 5. This relative wealth shift has the
same e¤ect as a decrease in the wage to non-wage income ratio . As argued in section
8.1, for su¢ ciently small values of  the income e¤ect starts to dominate the substitution
e¤ect, so that prices start to react negatively to increased return optimism.
8.3 Endogenous Boom and Bust Dynamics
We now explain how the interplay between price realizations and belief updating can
temporarily de-link asset prices from their fundamental values. This process emerges
endogenously and takes the form of a sustained asset price boom along which expected
returns rise and that ultimately results in a price bust along which expected returns fall.
43This follows from EPt Rt+i+1 = E
P
t
Pt+i+1+Dt+i+1
Pt+i
> EPt
Pt+i+1
Pt+i
= mt.
44This is hown in appendix A.9, which depicts the relationship between expected capital gains and
expected returns at various forecast horizons.
45This holds true under the maintained assumption of no or vanishing uncertainty.
26
This feature allows the model to generate volatile asset prices and to capture the positive
correlation between expected returns and the PD ratio.
Consider gure 5 and a situation in which agents become optimistic, in the sense
that their capital gains expectations mt increase slightly above the perfect foresight value
mt 1 = 
D entertained in the previous period.46 Figure 5 shows that this increase in
expectations leads to an increase in the PD ratio, i.e., Pt=Dt > Pt 1=Dt 1. Moreover, due
to the relatively steep slope of the PD function, realized capital gains will strongly exceed
the initial increase in expected capital gains. The belief updating equation (28) then im-
plies further upward revisions in price growth expectations and thus further capital gains,
leading to a sustained asset price boom in which the PD ratio and return expectations
jointly move upward.
The price boom comes to an end when expected price growth reaches a level close
to where the PD function in gure 5 reaches its maximum.47 At this point, stock prices
grow at most at the rate of dividends (D), but agents hold considerably more optimistic
expectations about future capital gains (mt > 
D). Investorshigh expectations will thus
be disappointed, which subsequently leads to a reversal.
The previous dynamics are also present in a stochastic model considered in the next
sections. They introduce low frequency movements in the PD ratio, allowing the model to
replicate boom and bust dynamics and thereby to empirically plausible amounts of asset
price volatility, despite assuming standard consumption preferences. These dynamics also
generate a positive correlation between the PD ratio and expected returns.48
9 Historical PD Ratio and Survey Evidence
This section considers the asset pricing model with subjective beliefs and uncertainty;
it shows that the model can successfully replicate the low-frequency movements in the
postwar U.S. PD ratio, as well as the available survey evidence.
Solving the non-linear asset pricing model with subjective beliefs is computationally
costly, which prevents us from pursuing formal estimation or moment matching. We thus
46In the model with uncertainty, such upward revisions can be triggered by fundamentals, e.g., by
an exceptionally high dividend growth realization in the previous period, which is associated with an
exceptionally high price growth realization.
47In the model with noise, fundamental shocks, e.g., a low dividend growth realization, can cause the
process to end well before reaching this point.
48While the arguments above only show that expected capital gains correlate positively with the PD
ratio, Appendix A.9 shows that expected capital gains and expected returns comove positively, so that
expected returns also comove positively with the PD ratio.
27
resort to calibration.
Table 6 reports the calibrated parameters and the calibration targets.49 The mean and
standard deviation of dividend growth (D and D) are chosen to match the corresponding
empirical moments of the U.S. dividend process. The ratio of non-dividend to dividend
income () is chosen to match the average dividend-consumption ratio in the U.S. for 1946-
2011.50 The standard deviation of wage innovations (W ) and the covariance between
wage and dividend innovations (DW ) are chosen, in line with Campbell and Cochrane
(1999), such that the correlation between consumption and dividend growth is 0.2 and the
standard deviation of consumption growth is one seventh of the the standard deviation
of dividend growth.51 The perceived uncertainty in stock price growth (") is set equal
to the empirical standard deviation of stock price growth.52
This leaves us with four remaining parameters: the belief updating parameter g, the
initial price growth belief mQ1:1946, the time discount factor  and the risk aversion para-
meter . We choose g = 0:02515 andmQ1:1946 =  1:11%, in line with the values employed
in constructing gure 3, which allowed matching the UBS survey expectations. We then
assume risk aversion of  = 2 and choose the quarterly discount factor , so as to obtain
a good match between the model-implied and the empirical PD ratio over the postwar
period. It turns out that  = 0:995 achieves a good t.
Figure 6 depicts the equilibrium PD ratio obtained from numerically solving the asset
pricing model with uncertainty, together with the equilibrium PD ratio in the absence of
uncertainty analyzed in the previous section.53 While the presence of price, dividend, and
wage risk lowers the equilibrium PD ratio compared to a setting without risk, the func-
tional form of the relationship remains qualitatively unchanged. The ndings obtained
49The targets are chosen to match features of the fundamental processes emphasized in the asset
pricing literature.
50See appendix A.3 for further details.
51For details on how this can be achieved, see appendix A.3.
52Since the gain parameter g will be small, the contribution of 2 in (16) is negligable.
53The numerical solution is obtained by numerically determining the stock demand function (12)
solving the FOC (41) under the subjectively perceived dividend, wage and price dynamics, where agents
understand that their beliefs evolve according to (28). The PD ratio as a function ofmt depicted in gure
6 is determined from the market clearing condition (27) assuming Wt=Dt = , to be comparable with
the value this variable assumes in the vanishing risk limit. We veried that in the limiting case without
uncertainty, our numerical solution algorithm recovers the analytical solution derived in proposition 2.
Furthermore, in the case with uncertainty, we insure the accuracy of the numerical solution by verifying
that the Euler equation errors are in the order of 10 5 over the relevant area of the state space. Insuring
this requires a considerable amount of adjustment by hand of the grid points and grid size used for
spanning the models state space. This prevents us from formally estimating the model, as the model
cannot be solved with su¢ cient accuracy using an automated procedure. Further details of the solution
approach are described in appendix A.10. The MatLab code used for solving the model is available upon
request.
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in the previous section thus continue to apply in the presence of quantitatively realistic
amounts of uncertainty.
We now evaluate the ability of the model to replicate the postwar time series of the
PD ratio. We do so by rst feeding the historical capital gains into our model-based
belief updating equation (28), so as to obtain a model-implied value for expected capital
gains.54 The resulting series is shown in gure 7. It displays a strong rise and fall of
price growth expectations around the year 2000, as well as relatively low capital gains
expectations from the mid 1970s to the mid 1980s. In a second step, we use the model-
implied equilibrium PD function to derive a model-implied time series for the PD ratio
associated with the model-based beliefs. Figure 8 depicts this model-implied PD series
and compares it with historical PD series.55
Figure 8 reveals that the model captures a lot of the low-frequency variation in the
historically observed PD ratio. It captures particularly well the variations before the year
2000, including the strong run-up in the PD ratio from the mid 1990s to year 2000. The
model also predicts a strong decline of the PD ratio after the year 2000, but overpredicts
the decline relative to the data. For the period up to and including the year 2000, the
variance of the gap between the model predicted PD and the PD in the data amounts
to just 20.1% of the overall variance of the PD in the data. In this sense, the subjective
belief model is capable of capturing approximately 79.9% of the variation of the PD ratio
in the data. Since the t deteriorates some time after the year 2000, it explains - using
the same measure - about 52.5% of the variance for the full sample. We nd this to be a
remarkable result.
Figure 9 depicts the model-implied price growth expectations and those implied by
the UBS survey.56 While the model ts the survey data overall well, the model predicts
after the year 2003 considerably lower capital gains expectations, which partly explains
why the model underpredicts the PD ratio in gure 8 towards the end of the sample
period. Yet, the expectations gap in gure 9 narrows considerably after the year 2004,
while this fails to be the case in gure 8. Underprediction of expected price growth thus
explains only partly the deterioration of the t of the PD ratio towards the end of the
sample period .
54We thereby shut down all other sources of information about price growth, i.e., set ln "1t = 0 for all
t in equation (28).
55When computing the model-implied PD ratio, we set the non-dividend to dividend income ratio
equal to its steady state value (Wt=Dt = ), so as to obtain only pricing e¤ects due to variation in
subjective capital gains expectations. The e¤ects of fundamental shocks to wages and dividends will be
considered in section 10.
56See footnote 25 for how to compute price growth expectations from the UBS survey.
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The gap after the year 2000 emerging in gure 8 is hardly surprising, given the empiri-
cal evidence presented in gure 4, which shows that the relationship between the PD ratio
and the expectations implied by equation (5) has shifted upward in the data following
the year 2000. While we can only speculate about potential reasons causing this shift,
the exceptionally low real interest rates implemented by the Federal Reserve following
the reversal of the tech stock boom and following the collapse of the subsequent housing
boom may partly contribute to the observed discrepancy. Formally incorporating the
e¤ects of monetary policy decisions - while of interest - is beyond the scope of the present
paper.
10 Model Simulations
The previous section evaluated to what extent subjective belief updating dynamics alone
can explain the behavior of the PD ratio in the data, but it ignored the role of the
fundamental dividend and wage processes as ultimate drivers of asset price and belief
dynamics. This section evaluates the ability of the model to replicate key asset pricing
moments, using model simulations with dividend and wage shocks as fundamental drivers.
To do so, we compare the asset pricing moments in the data to those obtained from
simulating the model, considering both the model with subjective beliefs as well as the
RE model. We use the parameters from table 6 to simulate the model and formally
evaluate the model t by reporting t-statistics for a number of asset pricing moments.57
Table 7 reports the data moments (column 2 of the table), the moments of the subjec-
tive beliefs models and the implied t-statistic (columns 3 and 4), as well as the moments
and t-statistics of the RE version of the model (columns 5 and 6).58 The rst eight asset
pricing moments listed in the table are those considered in Adam, Marcet, and Nicolini
(2013); we augment these by the correlation between the PD ratio and expected stock
returns, as implied by the UBS survey data.
The model with subjective beliefs turns out to be able to quantitatively account for
many asset pricing moments, even though parameters have not been chosen to maximize
the t.59 The RE version of the model performs rather poorly. Besides generating insu¢ -
57The t-statistic is based on an estimate of the standard deviation of the data moment as a measure
of uncertainty, where we estimate the standard deviation of the moment in the data using standard
procedures. This delivers an asymptotically valid t-test given the parameter values.
58All variables are reported in terms of quarterly real values.
59While this would be desirable, numerically solving the model with high accuracy is rather time-
consuming.
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cient asset price volatility, it wrongly predicts a negative sign for the correlation between
the PD ratio and investorsexpected returns.
Table 7 reveals that the subjective belief model quantitatively replicates 7 of the 9
considered moments at the 1% signicance level, while the RE version matches only
3 of the 9 moments. The learning model replicates particularly well the mean of the
PD ratio (denoted by E[PD] in the table), the high autocorrelation of the PD ratio
(Corr[PDt;PDt 1]), the regression coe¢ cient obtained from regressing 5 year ahead excess
returns on the current PD ratio (c), as well as the R2 of that regression (R2).60 The
model similarly matches the mean of the stock returns (E[rs]) and the positive correlation
between the PD ratio and expected returns (Corr[PDt,EPt Rt+1]). It generates a somewhat
too high value for the standard deviation of the PD ratio (Std[PD]) and - as a result -
predicts a too high value for the standard deviation of stock returns (Std[rs]). The
learning model also misses the equity premium, although it produces about half of the
premium observed in the data. This is a considerable success, given the low degree of
risk aversion assumed ( = 2).
Since none of these moments have been targeted when calibrating the model, the
ability of the subjective belief model to quantitatively replicate the data moments is
surprisingly good. This is especially true when compared to the performance of the
model under RE. Comparing the last column in table 7 to column 4 in the same table
shows that the t-statistics all increase (in absolute terms) when imposing RE, with some
increases being quite dramatic.
The RE version of the model produces insu¢ cient asset price volatility, i.e., too low
values for the standard deviation of the PD ratio and of stock returns. It also produces a
tiny equity premium only and gets the sign of the correlation between the PD ratio and
expected stock returns wrong. This highlights the strong quantitative improvement in
the empirical performance obtained by incorporating subjective belief dynamics. It also
highlights that - according to our model - asset price volatility is to a large extent due to
subjective belief dynamics.
11 Conclusions
We present a model with rationally investing agents that gives rise to market failures in
the sense that the equilibrium stock price deviates from its fundamental value. These
60The regression also includes a constant, which is statistically insignicant and whose value is not
reported.
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deviations take the form of asset price boom and bust cycles that are fueled by the belief-
updating dynamics of investors who behave optimally given their imperfect knowledge
of the world. Investors update beliefs about market behavior using observed market
outcomes and Bayeslaw, causing their subjective expectations about future capital gains
to comove positively with the price-dividend ratio, consistent with the evidence available
from investor surveys. As we argue, this feature cannot be replicated within asset pricing
models that impose rational price expectations.
We relax slightly the RE assumption but maintain full rationality of investors. The fact
that a fairly small deviation from a standard asset pricing model signicantly improves
the empirical t of the model strongly suggests that issues of learning are important when
accounting for stock price uctuations. Indeed, our empirical analysis shows that more
than half of the observed variation of the S&P500 PD ratio over the post-war period can
be accounted for by variations in subjective beliefs.
If asset price dynamics are to a large extent inuenced by investorssubjective belief
dynamics, i.e., by subjective optimism and pessimism, then the asset price uctuations
observed in the data are to considerable extent ine¢ cient. Due to a number of sim-
plifying assumptions, this did not yield adverse welfare implications within the present
setup.61 For more realistic models incorporating investor heterogeneity, endogenous out-
put or endogenous stock supply, such uctuations can give rise to signicant distortions
that a¤ect welfare. Exploring these within a setting that gives rise to quantitatively cred-
ible amounts of asset price uctuations appears to be an interesting avenue for further
research. Such research will in turn lead to further important questions, such as whether
policy can and should intervene with the objective to stabilize asset prices.
61This is true if one evaluates welfare using ex-post realized consumption.
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UBS Gallup
Nominal Real Ret. Exp. Real Ret. Exp.
Return Exp. (SPF) (Michigan)
Average Median Average Median Average Median
Own portfolio,
>100k US$
0.80
(0.01)
0.78
(0.01)
0.79
(0.01)
0.77
(0.01)
0.84
(0.01)
0.83
(0.01)
Own portfolio,
all investors
0.80
(0.01)
0.76
(0.02)
0.79
(0.01)
0.75
(0.02)
0.84
(0.01)
0.80
(0.01)
Stock market,
>100k US$
0.90
(0.03)
0.89
(0.04)
0.90
(0.03)
0.88
(0.03)
0.91
(0.03)
0.88
(0.03)
Stock market,
all investors
0.90
(0.03)
0.87
(0.04)
0.90
(0.03)
0.87
(0.04)
0.91
(0.03)
0.88
(0.03)
Table 1: Correlation between PD ratio and 1-year ahead expected return measures
(UBS Gallup Survey, robust p-values in parentheses)
Shiller Nominal Real Capital Gain. Real Capital Gain
Survey Capital Gain Exp. Exp. (SPF) Exp. (Michigan)
Horizon Average Median Average Median Average Median
1 month 0.46
(0.01)
0.48
(0.01)
0.45
(0.01)
0.47
(0.01)
0.46
(0.01)
0.49
(0.01)
3 months 0.57
(0.01)
0.64
(0.00)
0.54
(0.01)
0.61
(0.00)
0.56
(0.01)
0.62
(0.01)
6 months 0.58
(0.01)
0.75
(0.01)
0.54
(0.02)
0.70
(0.01)
0.56
(0.02)
0.71
(0.01)
1 year 0.43
(0.03)
0.69
(0.01)
0.38
(0.05)
0.62
(0.01)
0.42
(0.04)
0.64
(0.02)
10 years 0.74
(0.01)
0.75
(0.01)
0.66
(0.02)
0.71
(0.01)
0.71
(0.02)
0.75
(0.01)
Table 2: Correlation between PD ratio and expected stock price growth
(Shillers Individual InvestorsSurvey, robust p-values in parentheses)
CFO Nominal Real Return Real Return
Survey Return Exp. Exp. (SPF) Exp. (Michigan)
Average Median Average Median Average Median
1 year 0.71
(0.00)
0.75
(0.00)
0.62
(0.00)
0.69
(0.00)
0.67
(0.00)
0.72
(0.00)
Table 3: Correlation between PD ratio and 1-year ahead expected stock
return measures (CFO Survey, robust p-values in parentheses)
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Variables Time Period Stock Index Correlation
PD, 1 year-ahead real return
UBS Gallup sample
(stock market exp.) S&P 500
 0:66
(0:08)
PD, 1 year-ahead real price growth Shiller 1 year sample Dow Jones
 0:42
(0:06)
PD, 10 year-ahead real price growth Shiller 10 year sample Dow Jones
 0:88
(0:16)
PD, 1 year-ahead real return CFO sample S&P 500
 0:46
(0:06)
Table 4: Correlation between PD and actual real returns/capital gains
(robust p-value in parentheses)
bc  103 bbc  103 p-value bc  103 bbc  103 p-value
Survey measure H0 : bc = bbc H0 : bc = bbc
S&P 500, real returns
Survey Average Survey Median
UBS*, >100k, 1 yr, SPF 0.56 -2.93 0.0000 0.44 -2.93 0.0000
UBS*, >100k, 1 yr, Michigan 0.55 -2.93 0.0000 0.43 -2.93 0.0000
UBS*, all, 1 yr, SPF 0.54 -2.93 0.0000 0.45 -2.93 0.0000
UBS*, all, 1 yr, Michigan 0.53 -2.93 0.0000 0.44 -2.93 0.0000
CFO, 1 yr, SPF 0.20 -1.88 0.0004 0.24 -1.74 0.0366
CFO, 1 yr, Michigan 0.26 -1.88 0.0002 0.32 -1.74 0.0252
Dow Jones, real price growth
Survey Average Survey Median
Shiller, 1 yr, SPF 0.23 -1.48 0.0000 0.23 -1.48 0.0000
Shiller, 1 yr, Michigan 0.28 -1.48 0.0000 0.29 -1.48 0.0000
Shiller, 10 yrs, SPF 4.11 -6.48 0.0000 5.49 -6.48 0.0000
Shiller, 10 yrs, Michigan 3.51 -6.48 0.0000 4.89 -6.48 0.0000
*stock market return expectations
Table 5: Forecast rationality test using the PD ratio
Parameter Value Calibration Target
D 1:0048 average quarterly real dividend growth
D 0:0192 std. deviation quarterly real dividend growth
 22 average consumption-dividend ratio
DW  3:74  10 4 jointly chosen s.t. corrt(Ct+1=Ct; Dt+1=Dt) = 0:2
W 0:0197 and stdt(Ct+1=Ct) = 17stdt(Dt+1=Dt)
" 0:0816 std. deviation of quarterly real stock price growth
Table 6: Model calibration
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U.S. Data Subj. Beliefs RE
Moment Moment t-stat Moment t-stat
E[PD] 139.7 122.2 0.70 105.5 1.37
Std[PD] 65.3 97.3 -2.17 3.94 4.15*
Corr[PDt, PDt 1] 0.98 0.98 0.54 -0.0058 >100*
Std[rs] 8.01 9.44 -3.57* 4.23 9.50*
c -0.0041 -0.0049 0.67 -0.0126 7.08*
R2 0.24 0.18 0.47 0.12 0.93
E[rs] 1.89 1.93 -0.09 1.50 0.84
E[rb] 0.13 0.97 -5.10* 1.50 -8.28*
UBS Survey Data:
Corr[PDt,EPt Rt+1] 0.79 0.85 -0.79 -0.99 24.86*
* indicates rejection at the 1% level
Table 7: Asset pricing moments
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Figure 1: Quarterly PD Ratio of the S&P 500
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Figure 2: PD ratio and investorsexpected returns (UBS Gallup Survey)
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Figure 3: UBS survey expectations versus adaptive prediction model
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Figure 5: PD ratio and expected capital gains (vanishing noise)
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Figure 6: The e¤ects of uncertainty on the equilibrium PD ratio
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Figure 7: Price growth expectations implied by Bayesian updating and historical price
growth information
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Figure 9: Price growth expectations: UBS survey vs. Bayesian updating model
38
A Appendix (not for publication)
A.1 Data Sources
Stock price data: our stock price data is for the United States and has been downloaded
from The Global Financial Database(http://www.globalnancialdata.com). The period
covered is Q1:1946-Q1:2012. The nominal stock price series is the SP 500 Composite
Price Index (w/GFD extension)(Global Fin code _SPXD). The daily series has been
transformed into quarterly data by taking the index value of the last day of the considered
quarter. To obtain real values, nominal variables have been deated using the USA BLS
Consumer Price Index(Global Fin code CPUSAM). The monthly price series has been
transformed into a quarterly series by taking the index value of the last month of the
considered quarter. Nominal dividends have been computed as follows
Dt =

ID(t)=ID(t  1)
IND(t)=IND(t  1)   1

IND(t)
where IND denotes the SP 500 Composite Price Index (w/GFD extension)described
above and ID is the SP 500 Total Return Index (w/GFD extension)(Global Fin code
_SPXTRD ). We rst computed monthly dividends and then quarterly dividends by
adding up the monthly series. Following Campbell (2003), dividends have been deseason-
alized by taking averages of the actual dividend payments over the current and preceding
three quarters.
Stock market survey data: The UBS survey is the UBS Index of Investor Opti-
mism, which is available (against a fee) at
http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/ data_access/data/datasets/ubs_investor.html.
The quantitative question on stock market expectations has been surveyed over the
period Q2:1998-Q4:2007 with 702 responses per month on average and has thereafter
been suspended. For each quarter we have data from three monthly surveys, except for
the rst four quarters and the last quarter of the survey period where we have only one
monthly survey per quarter. The Shiller survey data covers individual investors over the
period Q1:1999Q1-Q4:2012 and has been kindly made available to us by Robert Shiller at
Yale University. On average 73 responses per quarter have been recorded for the question
on stock price growth. Since the Shiller data refers to the Dow Jones, we used the PD
ratio for the Dow Jones, which is available at http://www.djaverages.com/, to compute
correlations. The CFO survey is collected by Duke University and CFO magazine and
collects responses from U.S. based CFOs over the period Q3:2000-Q4:2012 with on average
390 responses per quarter, available at http://www.cfosurvey.org/ .
Ination expectations data: The Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) is avail-
able from the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia at http://www.phil.frb.org/research-
and-data/real-time-center/survey-of-professional-forecasters/. The Michigan Surveys of
Consumers are collected by Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan
(http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/).
A.2 Details of the t-Test in Section 3.2
Under the RE hypothesis, equations (1) and (3) both hold for the same parameters
aN ; cN , given any horizon N . These two equations dene a standard SUR model. De-
pendent variables are EPt R
N
t+N and R
N
t+N ; where the latter is the N -period rate of return
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and EPt R
N
t+N is the observed survey expectation at time t; explanatory variables in both
equations are xt = (1; PtDt ); satisfying the orthogonality conditions (2)-(4). For exposi-
tional clarity we relabel the true parameters in equation (3) as
 
aN ; cN

. The aim is to
design e¢ cient estimators of the true parameters N0  (aN ; cN ; aN ; cN) and to test the
hypothesis H0 : cN = cN :
As is standard in SUR models, without any additional assumption on the distribution
of u; "; P=D; the OLS estimator equation by equation T dened by
T 
2664
aNT
cNT
aNT
cNT
3775 =
 
TX
t=1
xtx
0
t 
 I2
! 1 TX
t=1
xt

EPt R
N
t+N
RNt+N

;
where I2 is a 2 2 identity matrix, is consistent and e¢ cient among the set of estimators
using only orthogonality conditions (2)-(4).
To simplify on notation we now drop the superscripts N in the remaining part of this
appendix. As is well known, with stationarity, strong ergodicity and bounded second
moments, the estimator is consistent and its asymptotic distribution as T !1 is given
by p
T (T   0)! N

0; [E(xtx
0
t)
 I2] 1 Sw [E(xtx0t)
 I2] 1

; (32)
where
Sw =  0 +
1X
k=1
 k +  
0
k
 k = E

ut
u"t

[ut k; u"t k]
 xtx0t k

;
where u"t  ut+ "t+N . To build the test-statistic, we now only need to nd an estimator
for var-cov matrix in (32).
We can estimate E (xtx0t) by
1
T
PT
t=1 xtx
0
t. To estimate the  k terms, we exploit the
special form of the error u"t. In particular, partition each  k into four 22 matrices, with
 ij;k denoting the (i; j)   th element of this partition. Then, letting but and cu"t denote
the calculated errors of each equation, we use standard estimators
 11;k;T =
1
T   k
T kX
t=1
but but k xtx0t k
 12;k;T =
1
T   k
T kX
t=1
but cu"t k xtx0t k
Since ut is not a forecasting error, there is no reason why  11;k should be zero for any k.
We deal with this by using Newey-West weights to truncate the innite sum in Sw.
Since "t+N is a forecast error using information up to t we have
 21;k = E([ut + "t+N ]ut kxtx0t k) =  11;k for all k  0;
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so estimated  11;k;T is an estimate of  21;k;T . Furthermore, we have
 22;k = E(u"t u"t k xtx0t k)
=  12;k + E("t+N"t+N k xtx0t k) for all k
where the second equality follows from E("t+N ut k xtx0t k) = 0. Moreover, since "t+N
is orthogonal to "t+N kxtx0t k for k  N we have  22;k =  12;k for k  N: Therefore, we
can use the relationship
 22;k;T =  21;k;T +
1
T   k
T kX
t=1
(cu"t   but) (cu"t k   but k) xtx0t k for k < N
=  21;k;T for k  N
which allows using the estimated  21;k;T as our estimate for  22;k.
A.3 Parameterization of the Wage Process
To calibrate  we compute the average dividend-consumption share in the U.S. from 1946-
2011, using the Net Corporate Dividendsand the Personal Consumption Expenditures
series from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This delivers an average ratio of  = 22.
Following Campbell and Cochrane (1999) we then choose the standard deviation of one-
step-ahead consumption growth innovations to be 1=7 of that of one-step-ahead dividend
growth innovations, i.e., s
vart(lnCt+1   lnCt)
vart(lnDt+1   lnDt) =
1
7
;
and the correlation between one-step-ahead consumption and dividend growth to be equal
to 0.2, i.e.
covt(lnCt+1   lnCt; lnDt+1   lnDt)p
vart(lnCt+1   lnCt)vart(lnDt+1   lnDt)
= 0:2
To achieve this we need to compute the required variance and covariances. We have
vart(lnDt+1   lnDt) = 2D
vart(lnCt+1   lnCt) = vart (ln(Dt+1 +Wt+1)  ln(Dt +Wt))
= vart
 
ln
 
Dt+1 + Dt+1"
W
t+1

= vart(lnDt+1 + ln(1 + "
W
t+1))
= vart(lnDt+1) + 2covt(lnDt+1; ln(1 + "
W
t+1)) + vart(ln(1 + "
W
t+1))
= 2D + 2covt(ln "
D
t+1; ln(1 + "
W
t+1)) + vart(ln(1 + "
W
t+1)) (33)
and
covt(lnCt+1   lnCt; lnDt+1   lnDt) = covt(lnCt+1; ln "Dt+1)
= covt(ln(Dt+1 +Wt+1); ln "
D
t+1)
= covt(lnDt+1 + ln(1 + "
W
t+1); ln "
D
t+1)
= covt(ln "
D
t+1 + ln(1 + "
W
t+1); ln "
D
t+1)
= 2D + covt(ln(1 + "
W
t+1); ln "
D
t+1) (34)
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Linearly approximating ln(1 + "Wt+1) around the unconditional mean "
W = 1 delivers
ln(1 + "Wt+1)  c+

1 + 
ln "Wt+1 +O(2)
where c is a constant and O(2) a second order approximation error. Using this approxi-
mation we have
vart(lnCt+1   lnCt)  2D + 2

1 + 
DW +


1 + 
2
2W (35)
So that s
vart(lnCt+1   lnCt)
vart(lnDt+1   lnDt) 
s
1 + 2

1 + 
DW
2D
+


1 + 
2
2W
2D
=
1
7
(36)
Using the approximation we also have
covt(lnCt+1   lnCt; lnDt+1   lnDt)p
vart(lnCt+1   lnCt)vart(lnDt+1   lnDt)

2D +

1+
WDs
2D + 2

1+
WD +


1+
2
2W

2D
= 0:2 (37)
Using (36) to substitute the root in the denominator in (37) we get
2D +

1+
WD
1
7
2D
= 0:2() WD =  68
70
1 + 

2D (38)
Using (36) we then get
2W =  
48
49

1 + 

2
2D   2
1 + 

WD
=
236
245

1 + 

2
2D: (39)
A.4 Existence of Optimum, Su¢ ciency of FOCs, Recursive So-
lution
Existence of Optimum & Su¢ ciency of FOCs. The choice set in (6) is compact
and non-empty. The following condition then insures existence of optimal plans:
Condition 1 The utility function u() is bounded above and for all i 2 [0; 1]
EP
i
0
1X
t=0
t u (Wt +Dt) >  1: (40)
The expression on the left-hand side of condition (40) is the utility associated with
never trading stocks (Sit = 1 for all t). Since this policy is always feasible, condition
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(40) guarantees that the objective function in (6) is also bounded from below, even if the
ow utility function u() is itself unbounded below. The optimization problem (6) thus
maximizes a bounded continuous utility function over a compact set, which guarantees
existence of a maximum.
Under the assumptions made in the main text (utility function given by (10), knowl-
edge of (7) and RE < 1), condition 1 holds, as can be seen from the following derivation:
EP
i
0
1X
t=0
t u (Wt +Dt)
= E0
1X
t=0
t u (Wt +Dt)
= E0
1X
t=0
t
 
(1 + "Wt )Dt
1 
=
 
(1 + "W0 )D0
1 
+ E0
1X
t=1
t
 
(1 + "Wt )Dt
1 
=
 
(1 + "W0 )D0
1 
+ E0
1X
t=1


 
D
1 t 
(1 + "Wt )"
D
t
t 1Y
k=1
"Dt
!1 
=
 
(1 + "W0 )D0
1 
+ E
h 
(1 + "W )"D
1 i  E0 1X
t=1


 
D
1 t t 1Y
k=1
"Dt
!1 
=
 
(1 + "W0 )D0
1 
+ E
h 
(1 + "W )"D
1 i  1X
t=1


 
D
1 t
e
2D
2
( 1)
t 1
=
 
(1 + "W0 )D0
1 
+
E
h 
(1 + "W )"D
1 i
e
2
D
2
( 1)

1X
t=1
 
RE
t
Since (6) is a strictly concave maximization problem the maximum is unique. With
the utility function being di¤erentiable, the rst order conditions
u0(Cit) = E
Pi
t

u0(Cit+1)
Pt+1 +Dt+1
Pt

(41)
plus a standard transversality condition are necessary and su¢ cient for the optimum.
Recursive Solution. We have a recursive solution whenever the optimal stockhold-
ing policy can be written as a time-invariant function Sit = S
i(xt) of some state variables
xt. We seek a recursive solution where xt contains appropriately rescaled variables that
do not grow to innity. With this in mind, we impose the following condition:
Condition 2 The ow utility function u () is homogeneous of degree   0. Further-
more, the beliefs P i imply that t 

Dt
Dt 1
; Pt
Dt
; Wt
Dt

has a state space representation,
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i.e., the conditional distribution P i(t+1j!t) can be written as
P i(t+1j!t) = F i(mit) (42)
mit = Ri(mit 1; t) (43)
for some nite-dimensional state vector lnmit and some time-invariant functions
F i and Ri.
Under Condition 2 problem (6) can then be re-expressed as
max
fSit2Sg1t=0
EP
i
0
1X
t=0
t Dt u

Sit 1

Pt
Dt
+ 1

  Sit
Pt
Dt
+
Wt
Dt

; (44)
given Si 1 = 1; where Dt is a time-varying discount factor satisfying D 1 = 1 and
Dt = Dt 1
 
D"Dt

:
The return function in (44) depends only on the exogenous variables contained in the
vector t. Since the beliefs P i are assumed to be recursive in t, standard arguments in
dynamic programming guarantee that the optimal solution to (44) takes the form (12).
This formulation of the recursive solution is useful, because scaling Pt and Wt by the
level of dividends eliminates the trend in these variables, as desired. This will be useful
when computing numerical approximations to Si(). The belief systems P i introduced in
section 6 will satisfy the requirements stated in condition 2.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 1
In equilibrium Sit = 1 for all t  0, so that the budget constraint implies
Cit = Dt +Wt = (1 + "
W
t )Dt:
Substituting into the agents rst order condition delivers
Pt = Et
"
(1 + "Wt+1)Dt+1
(1 + "Wt )Dt
 
(Pt+1 +Dt+1)
#
: (45)
Assuming that the following transversality condition holds
lim
j!1
Et
"
j
( 
1 + "Wt+j
1 + "Wt
!
Dt+j
Dt
) 
Pt+j
#
= 0; (46)
one can iterate forward on (45) to obtain
Pt
Dt
= Et
" 1X
j=1
j
 
1 + "Wt+j
1 + "Wt
!  
Dt+j
Dt
1 #
;
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Using Dt+j=Dt = (
D)j
Qj
k=1 
D
t+k one has
Pt
Dt
= (1 + "Wt )

1X
j=1
 
(D)1 
j
Et
24 1 + "Wt+j 
 
jY
k=1
Dt+k
!1 35
= (1 + "Wt )

1X
j=1
 
(D)1 
j
Et
h 
1 + "Wt+j
 
(Dt+j)
1 
i
Et
24 j 1Y
k=1
Dt+k
!1 35
= (1 + "Wt )
Et
h 
1 + "Wt+j
 
(Dt+j)
1 
i
e(1 )
2
D=2
RE
1  RE ;
as claimed in proposition 1.
A.6 Bayesian Foundations for Lagged Belief Updating
We now present a slightly modied information structure for which Bayesian updating
gives rise to the lagged belief updating equation (28). Specically, we generalize the
perceived price process (16) by splitting the temporary return innovation ln "t+1 into two
independent subcomponents:
lnPt+1   lnPt = ln t+1 + ln "1t+2 + ln "2t+1
with ln "1t+2  iiN( 
2
";1
2
; 2"1), ln "
2
t+1  iiN( 
2
"2
2
; 2"2) and
2" = 
2
"1 + 
2
"2:
We then assume that in any period t agents observe the prices, dividends and wages up to
period t, as well as the innovations "1t up to period t. Agentstime t information set thus
consists of It = fPt; Dt;Wt; "1t ; Pt 1; Dt 1;Wt 1; "1t 2; :::g. By observing the innovations
"1t , agents learn - with a one period lag - something about the temporary components
of price growth. The process for the persistent price growth component ln t remains as
stated in equation (17), but we now denote the innovation variance by 2ev instead of 2v.
As before, lnmt denotes the posterior mean of ln t given the information available at
time t. We prove below the following result:
Proposition 3 Fix 2" > 0 and consider the limit 
2
"2 ! 0 with 2ev = 2"2g2=(1   g).
Bayesian updating then implies
lnmt = lnmt 1   
2
v
2
+ g

lnPt 1   lnPt 1 + 
2
" + 
2
v
2
  lnmt 1

  g ln "1t (47)
The modied information structure thus implies that only lagged price growth rates
enter the current state estimate, so that beliefs are predetermined, precisely as assumed
in equation (28). Intuitively, this is so because lagged returns become innitely more
informative relative to current returns as 2"2 ! 0, which eliminates the simultaneity
problem. For non-vanishing uncertainty 2"2 the weight of the last observation actually
remains positive but would still be lower than that given to the lagged return observation,
see equation (50) in the proof below and the subsequent discussion for details.
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We now sketch the proof of the previous proposition. Let us dene the following
augmented information set eIt 1 = It 1 [ f"1tg. The posterior mean for t given eIt 1,
denoted lnmtjeIt 1 is readily recursively determined via
lnmtjeIt 1 = lnmt 1jeIt 2 
2ev
2
+eglnPt 1   lnPt 2   ln "1t + 2ev + 2"22   lnmt 1jt 1

(48)
and the steady state posterior uncertainty and the Kalman gain by
2 =
 2e +
q
(2e)2 + 42e2"2
2eg = 2
2"2
(49)
Standard updating formulas for normal distributions then imply that the posterior mean
of ln t using information set It can be derived by updating the posterior mean based oneIt 1 according to
lnmtjIt = lnmtjeIt 1+ 
2
2 + 2"1 + 
2
"2 + 
2ev (lnPt lnPt 1+
2"1 + 
2
"2 + 
2ev
2
 lnmtjeIt 1) (50)
Since 
2
2+2"1+
2
"2+
2ev <
2
2"2
= eg, the weight of the price observation dated t is reduced
relative to the earlier observation dated t   1 because it is noisier. Now consider the
limit 2"2 ! 0 and along the limit choose 2"1 = 2"   2"2 and 2ev = g21 g2"2, as assumed in
the proposition. Equation (50) then implies that lnmtjIt = lnmtjeIt 1 , i.e., the weight of
the last observation price converges to zero. Moreover, from 2ev = g21 g2"2 and (49) we geteg = g. Using these results, equation (48) can exactly be written as stated by equation
(47) in the main text.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof relies on the fact that in a situation without uncertainty the expectation
of a non-linear function of randomvariables is identical to the non-linear function of
the expectation of these random variables, i.e., for some continuous non-linear func-
tion f(; ) and some random variables Xt+j; Yt+j we have under the stated assumptions
EPt f(Xt+j; Yt+j) = f(E
P
t Xt+j; E
P
t Yt+j). Simplifying notation (and slightly abusing it) we
let Xt+j = EPt Xt+j for all j  1, so that Xt+j below denotes the subjective expectation
conditional on information at time t of the variable X at time t + j. The rst order
conditions (41) can then be written as
1 =

Ct+1+j
Ct+j
 
Rt+1+j ()
Ct+1+j
Pt+1+j +Dt+1+j
= 
1
 (Rt+1+j)
1 

Ct+j
Pt+j
(51)
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for all j  0. The budget constraint implies
St 1(Pt +Dt) = Ct  Wt + StPt =) St 1 = Ct  Wt
Pt +Dt
+
Pt
Pt +Dt
St
Iterating forward on the latter equation gives
St 1 =
Ct  Wt
Pt +Dt
+
Pt
Pt +Dt
Ct+1  Wt+1
Pt+1 +Dt+1
+
Pt
Pt +Dt
Pt+1
Pt+1 +Dt+1
Ct+2  Wt+2
Pt+2 +Dt+2
+ : : :
Repeatedly using equation (51) gives
St 1 =
Ct  Wt
Pt +Dt
+
Pt
Pt +Dt


1
 (Rt+1)
1 

Ct
Pt
  Wt+1
Pt+1 +Dt+1

+
Pt
Pt +Dt
Pt+1
Pt+1 +Dt+1


1
 (Rt+2)
1 

Ct+1
Pt+1
  Wt+2
Pt+2 +Dt+2

+ : : :
=
Ct
Pt +Dt
+ 
1
 (Rt+1)
1 

Ct
Pt +Dt
+
Pt
Pt +Dt

1
 (Rt+2)
1 

Ct+1
Pt+1 +Dt+1
+ : : :
  Wt
Pt +Dt
  Wt+1
Pt +Dt
1
Rt+1
  Wt+2
Pt +Dt
1
Rt+1Rt+2
  :::
=
Ct
Pt +Dt
+ 
1
 (Rt+1)
1 

Ct
Pt +Dt
+


1

2
(Rt+2Rt+1)
1 

Ct
Pt +Dt
+ : : :
  1
Pt +Dt
 1X
j=0
Wt+j
Yj
i=1
1
Rt+i
!
=
Dt
Pt +Dt
+
Ct
Pt +Dt
1X
j=1
 

1

j Yj
i=1
1
Rt+i
  1

!
  1
Pt +Dt
 1X
j=1
Yj
i=1
1
Rt+i

Wt+j
!
(52)
Imposing on the previous equation St 1 = 1 (the market clearing condition for period
t   1 if t > 1, or the initial condition for period t = 0) and Ct = Dt +Wt (the market
clearing condition for period t  0) one obtains the result stated in the proposition under
the convention that Rt+i = EPt Rt+i.
A.8 Verication of Conditions (29)
For the vanishing noise limit of the beliefs specied in section 6 we have
EPt [Pt+j] = (mt)
j Pt
EPt [Dt+j] =
 
D
j
Dt
EPt [Wt+j] =
 
D
j
Wt:
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We rst verify the inequality on the l.h.s. of equation (29). We have
lim
T!1
EPt [RT ] = mt + lim
T!1

D
mt
T 1
D
Dt
Pt
;
so that for mt > 1 the limit clearly satises limT!1EPt [RT ] > 1 due to the rst term
on the r.h.s.; for mt < 1 the second term on the r.h.s. increases without bound, due to
D > 1, so that limT!1EPt [RT ] > 1 also holds.
In a second step we verify that the inequality condition on the r.h.s. of equation (29)
holds for all subjective beliefs mt > 0. We have
lim
T!1
EPt
 
TX
j=1
Yj
i=1
1
Rt+i

Wt+j
!
= lim
T!1
WtE
P
t
 
TX
j=1
 
D
j Yj
i=1
1
Rt+i
!
= lim
T!1
Wt
TX
j=1
Xj (53)
where
Xj =
 
D
jQj
i=1(mt +

D
mt
i 1
DDt
Pt
)
 0 (54)
A su¢ cient condition for the innite sum in (53) to converge is that the terms Xj are
bounded by some exponentially decaying function. The denominator in (54) satises
Yj
i=1
(mt +

D
mt
i 1
D
Dt
Pt
)
 (mt)j +

D
mt
j( j 12 )
D
Dt
Pt
; (55)
where the rst term captures the the pure products in mt, the second term the pure
products in

D
mt
i 1
DDt
Pt
, and all cross terms have been dropped. We then have
Xj =
 
D
jQj
i=1(mt +

D
mt
i 1
DDt
Pt
)

 
D
j
(mt)
j +

D
mt
j( j 12 )
DDt
Pt
=
1
mt
D
j
+

D
mt
j( j 12 ) 1
(D)
j 1
Dt
Pt
;
where all terms in the denominator are positive. For mt  D > 1 we can use the rst
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Figure 10: Expected return as a function of expected capital gain
term in the denominator to exponentially bound Xj , as Xj 

D
mt
j
; for mt < 
D we
can use the second term:
Xj  1
D
mt
j( j 12 ) 1
(D)
j 1
Dt
Pt
=
1
D
mt
 j
2 1
D
j 1
Dt
Pt
Since mt < 
D there must be a J <1 such that
D
mt
 j
2 1
D
 
D
mt
> 1
for all j  J , so that the Xj are exponentially bounded for all j  J .
A.9 Capital Gains Expectations and Expected Returns: Fur-
ther Details
Figure 10 depicts how expected returns at various horizons depend on agents expected
price growth expectations using the same parameterization as used in gure 5. It shows
that expected returns covary positively with capital gains expectations for mt  D, as
has been claimed in the main text. The atish part at aroundmt 1  0:01 arises because
in that area the PD ratio increases strongly, so that the dividend yield falls. Only for
pessimistic price growth expectations (mt < 
D) and long horizons of expected returns
we nd a negative relationship. The latter emerges because with prices expected to fall,
the dividend yield will rise and eventually result in high return expectations.
A.10 Numerical Solution Algorithm
Algorithm: We solve for agents state-contingent, time-invariant stockholdings (and
consumption) policy (12) using time iteration in combination with the method of en-
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dogenous grid points. Time iteration is a computationally e¢ cient, e.g., Aruoba et al.
(2006), and convergent solution algorithm, see Rendahl (2013). The method of endoge-
nous grid points, see Carroll (2006), economizes on a costly root nding step which speeds
up computations further.
Evaluations of Expectations: Importantly, agents evaluate the expectations in the
rst order condition (41) according to their subjective beliefs about future price growth
and their (objective) beliefs about the exogenous dividend and wage processes. Expecta-
tions are approximated via Hermite Gaussian quadrature using three interpolation nodes
for the exogenous innovations.
Approximation of Optimal Policy Functions: The consumption/stockholding
policy is approximated by piecewise linear splines, which preserves the nonlinearities
arising in particular in the PD dimension of the state space. Once the state-contingent
consumption policy has been found, we use the market clearing condition for consumption
goods to determine the market clearing PD ratio for each price-growth belief mt.
Accuracy: Carefully choosing appropriate grids for each belief is crucial for the
accuracy of the numerical solution. We achieve maximum (relative) Euler errors on the
order of 10 3 and median Euler errors on the order of 10 5 (average: 10 4).
Using our analytical solution for the case with vanishing noise, we can assess the
accuracy of our solution algorithm more directly. Setting the standard deviations of
exogenous disturbances to 10 16 the algorithm almost perfectly recovers the equilibrium
PD ratio of the analytical solution: the error for the numerically computed equilibrium
PD ratio for any price growth belief mt on our grid is within 0.5 % of the analytical
solution.
References
Adam, K., and A. Marcet (2011): Internal Rationality, Imperfect Market Knowledge
and Asset Prices,Journal of Economic Theory, 146, 12241252.
Adam, K., A. Marcet, and J. P. Nicolini (2013): Stock Market Volatility and
Learning,University of Mannheim Mimeo.
Aruoba, B., J. Fernandez-Villaverde, and J. Rubio-Ramirez (2006): Com-
paring solution methods for dynamic equilibrium economies, Journal of Economic
Dynamics and Control, 30.
Asparouhova, E., P. Bossaerts, N. Roy, and W. Zame (2013): Experiments on
the Lucas Asset Pricing Model,NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2013 (forthcoming).
Bacchetta, P., E. Mertens, and E. van Wincoop (2009): Predictability in Fi-
nancial Markets: What Do Survey Expectations Tell Us?, Journal of International
Money and Finance, 28, 406426.
Bansal, R., and A. Yaron (2004): Risks for the Long Run: A Potential Resolution
of Asset Pricing Puzzles,Journal of Finance, 59, 14811509.
Boswijk, P., C. H. Hommes, and S. Manzan (2007): Behavioral Heterogeneity in
Stock Prices,Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31, 19381970.
50
Branch, W. A., and G. Evans (2011): Learning about Risk and Return: A Simple
Model of Bubbles and Crashes, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 3,
159191.
Brock, W. A., and C. H. Hommes (1998): Heterogeneous Beliefs and Routes to
Chaos in a Simple Asset Pricing Model,Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control,
22, 12351274.
Bullard, J., and J. Duffy (2001): Learning and Excess Volatility,Macroeconomic
Dynamics, 5, 272302.
Campbell, J. Y. (2003): Consumption-Based Asset Pricing, in Handbook of Eco-
nomics and Finance, ed. by G. M. Constantinides, M. Harris, and R. Stulz, pp. 803887.
Elsevier, Amsterdam.
Campbell, J. Y., and J. H. Cochrane (1999): By Force of Habit: A Consumption-
Based Explanation of Aggregate Stock Market Behavior, Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 107, 205251.
Carroll, C. D. (2006): The Method of Endogenous Gridpoints for Solving Dynamic
Stochastic Optimization Problems,Economics Letters, 91, 312320.
Cogley, T., and T. J. Sargent (2008): The Market Price of Risk and the Equity
Premium: A Legacy of the Great Depression?,Journal of Monetary Economics, 55,
454476.
DeLong, J. B., A. Shleifer, L. H. Summers, and R. J. Waldmann (1990): Posi-
tive Feedback Investment Strategies and Destabilizing Rational Speculation,Journal
of Finance, 45, 379395.
Eusepi, S., and B. Preston (2011): Expectations, Learning, and Businss Cycle Fluc-
tuations,American Economic Review, 101, 28442872.
(2013): Fiscal Foundations of Ination: Imperfect Knowledge,Monash Uni-
versity mimeo.
Fama, E. F., and K. R. French (1988): Dividend Yields and Expected Stock Re-
turns,Journal of Financial Economics, 22, 325.
Fuster, A., B. Herbert, and D. Laibson (2011): Natural Expectations, Macroeco-
nomic Dynamics and Asset Prices,in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2011. NBER.
Hassan, T. A., and T. M. Mertens (2010): The Social Cost of Near-Rational In-
vestment,NYU Working Paper 2451/29843.
Kreps, D. (1998): Anticipated Utility and Dynamic Choice,in Frontiers of Research
in Economic Theory, ed. by D. Jacobs, E. Kalai, and M. Kamien, pp. 242274. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge.
Lansing, K. J. (2010): Rational and Near-Rational Bubbles Without Drift,Economic
Journal, 120, 11491174.
51
Lucas, R. E. (1978): Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy,Econometrica, 46, 1426
1445.
Malmendier, U., and S. Nagel (2011): Depression Babies: Do Macroeconomic
Experiences A¤ect Risk Taking,Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126, 373416.
(2013): Learning from Ination Experiences, Berkeley University Working
Paper.
Marcet, A., and T. J. Sargent (1989): Convergence of Least Squares Learning
Mechanisms in Self Referential Linear Stochastic Models,Journal of Economic The-
ory, 48, 337368.
Nagel, S., and R. Greenwood (2009): Inexperienced Investors and Bubbles,Jour-
nal of Financial Economics, 93(2), 239258.
Rendahl, P. (2013): Inequality Constraint and Euler Equation Based Solution Meth-
ods,Economic Journal (forthcoming).
Roy, R. (1989): Asymptotic covariance structure of serial correlations in multivariate
time series,Biometrika, 76, 8247.
Timmermann, A. (1993): How Learning in Financial Markets Generates Excess
Volatility and Predictability in Stock Prices,Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108,
11351145.
(1996): Excess Volatility and Predictability of Stock Prices in Autoregressive
Dividend Models with Learning,Review of Economic Studies, 63, 523557.
Vissing-Jorgensen, A. (2003): Perspectives on Behavioral Finance: Does "Irra-
tionality" Disappear with Wealth? Evidence from Expectations and Actions,in 2003
Macroeconomics Annual, Boston. NBER.
West, M., and J. Harrison (1997): Bayesian Forecasting and Dynamic Models.
Springer, Berlin.
52
